





Self-Reliance in Kalobeyei?

Socio-Economic Outcomes for refugees in North-West Kenya







Contents

Executive summary	4
1. Introduction	6
2. Methodology	10
3. Sustainable well-being	12
Subjective well-being	12
Food security	13
Assets	15
Leisure and social participation	15
4. Economic activities	16
Employment	16
Income	18
Agriculture	18
5. Access to public goods	20
Healthcare	20
Water	21
Education	22
Electricity	24
Dependency on aid	24
6. Access to markets	25
Market for goods	25
Labour market	27
Financial market	28
7. Access to networks	30
Household composition	30
Remittances	32
Communication technologies	33
Mobility	33
8. Personal characteristics	35
Demographic characteristics	35
Arrival date	36
Education	37
Household background	37
Preliminary regressions	38
9. Environment	39
Living environment	40
Relationship with the host community	41
Regulatory environment	43
10. Policy recommendations	45
Acknowledgments	48

Published by the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, July 2018. Designed by the University of Oxford Design Studio. Printed by Oxuniprint.

Citation: Betts, A. et al (2018), Self-Reliance in Kalobeyei? Socio-Economic Outcomes for Refugees in North-West Kenya (Oxford:RSC).

Cover photo: Market street in Kalobeyei. Credit: RSC

Executive summary

Context. Kenya hosts nearly 500,000 refugees. 1 Most of these refugees are from Somalia, but Kenya also hosts refugees from South Sudan, Ethiopia, DRC, Burundi, and Sudan. Historically, most of the refugees have been concentrated in three main locations: the Dadaab camps, the Kakuma camps and Nairobi.

Background. The Kalobeyei settlement was conceived in 2015, just 30 km from Kakuma in Turkana County. It was a joint initiative of UNHCR and the regional government, supported with funding from the European Union. Its aim was to take pressure off the Kakuma camps and to transition refugee assistance from an aid-based model to a self-reliance model. It would offer opportunities for economic inclusion and greater interaction with the host community. Refugees in the Kakuma camp were expected to relocate voluntarily to Kalobeyei. However, the unexpected arrival of large numbers of South Sudanese refugees required a need for greater flexibility in the implementation of this model, and emergency assistance was made available. Nevertheless, Kalobeyei's planners have retained a significant commitment to selfreliance. For example, Kalobeyei has differed from Kakuma in having designated market areas, more extensive use of a cash-assistance programme called Bamba Chakula ('get your food'), and greater promotion of subsistence agriculture.

Primary questions. Given that recently arrived South Sudanese refugees have been allocated to both Kalobeyei (more of a 'self-reliance model') and Kakuma (more of an 'aid model'),² this offers a unique opportunity to compare outcomes for refugees across the two contexts. We focus specifically on recently arrived refugees to examine three central questions. First, how can we measure self-reliance for new arrivals in both contexts? Second, to what extent is self-reliance greater in the new Kalobeyei settlement compared with the old Kakuma camp? Third, how can selfreliance be enhanced in such a difficult environment?

Methodology. The report draws upon data collected from the first of three waves of surveys to be carried out over a threeyear period. The resulting panel data set will be used to compare the self-reliance and the socio-economic indicators of recent arrivals living in the Kalobeyei settlement and the Kakuma camp. From August to November 2017 we interviewed 2,560 adults from 1,397 households, and conducted focus groups and semi-structured interviews with refugees and other stakeholders.

Theory. An ongoing challenge within policy and academic literature relates to how to measure 'self-reliance', and how to distinguish it from a more general measure of well-being. Our conceptual framework identifies five key dimensions of self-reliance in a refugee context: sustainable well-being, economic activity, access to public goods, access to markets, and access to networks. Our survey was designed to enable us to (1) measure variation in outcomes across these dimensions; and (2) explain variation across these dimensions.

Sustainable well-being. Most newly arrived refugees are dissatisfied with their life in Kalobeyei and Kakuma. Food security and the dietary diversity of new arrivals is poor in both Kakuma and Kalobeyei. On a positive note, these indicators are slightly better for South Sudanese recent arrivals living in Kalobeyei compared with those living in Kakuma: 1.8 meals per day versus 1.5 meals per day, and 89% are food insecure in Kakuma compared with 79% in Kalobeyei. They also had greater food diversity: 76% compared with 58.5% classified as having an acceptable diversity score. This difference may be due to them being able to cultivate their allocated plots of land (36% have a kitchen garden in Kalobeyei compared with 20% in Kakuma), and to freely exchange surplus production. Most individuals and households have limited assets. South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma own slightly more assets than those in Kalobeyei.

Economic activities. Few refugees have an incomegenerating activity. Most of those employed are hired by NGOs as incentive workers with pay restrictions. While many households are involved or willing to be involved in agriculture, access to water and seeds is limiting agricultural production. Few refugees engage in animal husbandry, an activity reserved for the host pastoralist population. South Sudanese refugees in Kalobeyei have a higher median income at 40 USD per month compared with 23 USD per month in Kakuma. Nevertheless, the lack of economic activities in Kakuma and Kalobeyei suggests that many residents in both areas are still a long way from economic self-reliance.

Access to public goods and aid. Refugees' access to public goods is mixed. Compared to the situation in their countries of origin, refugees enjoy better access to healthcare and education, especially in Kakuma. However, the vast majority consider their access to these services, as well as to resources such as water and electricity, to be inadequate. These limitations affect the scope and scale of economic activities that can take place in the two sites. While agriculture is essential to ensure refugee self-reliance, this sector cannot be expanded without improved access to water, and there are questions of whether there is enough arable land available for the agricultural demand. The absence of electricity impedes entrepreneurship.

Access to markets. Many markets are underdeveloped and constrained in Kalobeyei. The labour market is almost non-existent, except for the few jobs offered by NGOs. Refugees cannot work as herders or wood collectors, as these activities are reserved for the host population. The market for goods is largely dependent on the Bamba Chakula food programme. Combined with Kalobeyei's distance from Kenya's major markets, this seems to constrain the organic emergence of a complementary cash economy. Access to formal credit and savings institutions is limited.

Access to networks. Most refugees' personal networks do not offer access to start-up capital for a business or to

As of February 2018.

In practice, neither Kalobeyei nor Kakuma is based on a pure self-reliance or aid model. Nevertheless, they occupy contrasting positions on a spectrum, and several programmatic interventions designed to promote self-reliance exist in Kalobeyei that do not exist to the same extent in Kakuma.



make ends meet. Very few households receive remittances, and contact with their country of origin is infrequent.

Personal characteristics. Refugees are, on the whole, young. The demographic structure of households varies a lot between the sites. In Kakuma camps 1 and 2, many recent arrivals are living with the 'old caseload' in larger and wealthier households. In Kalobeyei, three quarters of South Sudanese adults are women. South Sudanese households are in fact often headed by mothers whose husband is either dead, missing, or living in South Sudan. For these households, taking care of children while engaging in economic activities is an important challenge that should not be overlooked. Education levels are low, especially among South Sudanese recent arrivals from rural areas. If access to water and sufficient amounts of arable land were not problems, agriculture would certainly be the most appropriate economic activity for the bulk of refugees, given their former livelihood experiences and existing skill sets.

Environment. The hostile climate and remoteness of Kalobeyei and Kakuma negatively affect economic activities. Relations with the host population are at times mutually beneficial, and at times conflictual. In practice, the legal constraints imposed on refugees living in Kalobeyei are not much different from those in Kakuma: (1) refugees cannot legally leave their designated camp or settlement without obtaining a movement pass; (2) they cannot be employed without obtaining a Class M work permit, the difficulty of doing so having limited most refugees to 'incentive work' with pay limitations; and (3) they do not own the land or own the fixed assets they build on the land. These environmental constraints negatively affect refugees' investments in businesses.

Comparing models. While this is only one case study – and is still at a very early phase following the South Sudanese influx - data on recently arrived South Sudanese refugees

suggests that the 'self-reliance model' adopted in Kalobeyei may be better for income, food security and consumption. However, the 'aid model' may be better for asset accumulation, participation in sports and community activities.

Implications. This report makes a number of original contributions. First, it offers a basis on which to begin to measure the progressive self-reliance of refugees. Second, it focuses specifically on the challenges of achieving self-reliance among recently arrived refugees. Third, it offers a comparison of the degree of self-reliance achieved within two contrasting assistance models, which occupy different positions on a spectrum between an 'aid model' and a 'self-reliance model'. Furthermore, it identifies policy recommendations for better promoting refugee self-reliance within Turkana County.



1. Introduction

In 2015 the Kalobeyei settlement was conceived as a collaboration between UNHCR and the Turkana County government. Its aim was to transition refugee assistance from an aid-based to a self-reliance model, while also increasing opportunities for interaction between refugees and hosts. Refugees in the Kakuma camp were expected to relocate voluntarily to Kalobeyei. However, due to an unanticipated influx of South Sudanese refugees, Kalobeyei's plans were forced to adapt to include emergency assistance. Nevertheless, there has been an ongoing commitment to the promotion of self-reliance in the new settlement.



This raises a number of questions. To what degree are refugees living in the new Kalobeyei settlement self-reliant? Are they more or less self-reliant than other recent arrivals living in the old Kakuma camp? How can self-reliance be enhanced in such a difficult environment? This report outlines the initial findings of the first wave of data collection, which took place from August to November 2017. It identifies and quantifies key differences between the Kalobeyei settlement and the Kakuma refugee camp, in terms of self-reliance outcomes.3

The Kalobeyei settlement was created in June 2015, and opened to refugees a year later, with the intention to facilitate integrated self-reliance for refugees and the host community within Turkana County, Kenya. The Kalobeyei Integrated Social and Economic Development Programme (KISEDP)

aims to support the local economy and coordinate service delivery at the Kalobeyei site. The KISEDP interventions are structured around four components: (1) Sustainable integrated service delivery and skills development; (2) Spatial planning and infrastructure development; (3) Agriculture and livestock; (4) Private sector and entrepreneurship. Each of these areas entails a series of sequenced actions led by a range of stakeholders. Implementing organisations include UNHCR, FAO, UNICEF, and WFP. KISEDP is supported by the EU's Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) with a contribution of 15 million Euros. This programme aims to 'enhance self-reliance opportunities and integrated service delivery' based on actions that are 'evidence-based, innovative, and sustainable'.4

³ This report describes conditions during fieldwork carried out in 2017, some of which may have subsequently changed. For example, the World Food Programme (WFP) Bamba Chakula market in Kalobeyei is no longer open.

The Kalobeyei project was initially intended to resettle households voluntarily from Kakuma to Kalobeyei. However, the unanticipated arrival of South Sudanese refugees and the proposed closure of the Dadaab refugee camps in eastern Kenya affected this initial plan. Kalobeyei had to expand rapidly to accommodate the new arrivals and thus relied heavily on temporary shelters, with little time and money to implement all the planned projects. The flow of new arrivals has recently slowed, and hence a number of selfreliance projects are currently being rolled out with a focus on agriculture and kitchen gardens, ensuring that Kalobeyei remains a fertile ground within which to study the progressive attainment of self-reliance by recently arrived refugees.

What is self-reliance?

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines self-reliance as 'the social and economic ability of an individual, a household or a community to meet essential needs (including protection, food, water, shelter, personal safety, health and education) in a sustainable manner and with dignity.'5 However, this still leaves open the question of how to measure self-reliance as an outcome.⁶ Self-reliance is not a dichotomous variable; it is complex, multifaceted, and exists on a spectrum. Indeed, UNHCR has highlighted Kalobeyei's wider significance, claiming 'it represents our new approach that is going global to refugee response' because of the new focus on self-reliance and refugees' interactions with the host community.⁷

Fig. 1 outlines our conceptual framework, highlighting five dimensions of self-reliance. This includes two self-reliance outcomes (economic activities and sustainable well-being) as well as three forms of access that should correspond

to improved outcomes (access to public goods and aid, access to markets, and access to networks). Beyond these five dimensions, there are personal and environmental characteristics beyond the control of individuals or households that that can create both barriers and opportunities for selfreliance. Our survey was designed to measure (1) variation in the five dimensions of self-reliance across groups; and (2) changes in these dimensions across time. By analysing the relationships between these different dimensions, our research will help to explain these variations and changes. The structure of this report draws upon the conceptual framework.

Kalobeyei and Kakuma provide a valuable empirical context within which to comparatively explore refugees' progressive attainment of self-reliance. This is in part because they have contrasting assistance models. At the time of our research, not all of the proposed self-reliance interventions had been implemented, but three notable differences between the models stand out: planning and design, the use of Bamba Chakula, and the role of kitchen gardens.

Planning and design

Both Kalobeyei and Kakuma are divided into smaller units. Kakuma began in 1992 with what is now Kakuma camp 1. As the population grew, the camp expanded north-west to include camps 2, 3 and 4. While camp 1 developed organically as refugees built structures on plots, the other camps developed based on top-down planning schemes. This is most evident in camp 4, where the grid system contrasts with the seemingly haphazard layout of camp 1. Each camp is further subdivided into zones and then blocks, all with their own leadership structure.




Fig. 1: Conceptual framework for understanding self-reliance

For an overview of the programme see European Union (2016), 'Regional Development and Protection Programme in Kenya: Support to the Kalobeyei Development Programme, July 2016-June 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/horn-africa/kenya/regional-development-and-protection-programme-kenya-support-kalobeyei en

UNHCR (2005). Self-Reliance Handbook (Genera: UNHCR)

The NGO RefugePoint is among the first organisations to create a way of measuring progressive self-reliance for operational purposes.

UNHCR Head of Communications, Al Jazeera, 8 June 2018, https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=S3nj38zTQKs

In contrast, Kalobeyei was highly planned from the beginning by UN Habitat, UNHCR, and the County Government. It is subdivided into three villages. The first residents of village 1 arrived in 2016, after which arrivals were allocated to plots in villages 2 and 3. These villages are divided by land transected by small seasonal streams, intended for eventual agricultural development. The three villages are subdivided into neighbourhoods, each consisting of multiple 28-house compounds. Compounds are arranged in a rectangular format, with 14 houses on either half of the rectangle. Each compound is supposed to be equipped with a centrally located solar light post and water tank, and kitchen gardens are meant to be constructed behind houses in the interior of the compound. In practice, however, many compounds diverge from this intended layout. Kalobeyei was also intended to have a more structured zoning plan. Whereas businesses are not formally recognised in the spatial layout of Kakuma, as all structures are registered as 'shelters', Kalobeyei settlement has designated residential and market areas, the latter of which are set aside for businesses. In sum, Kalobeyei has been organised with more attention to spatial design, infrastructural planning, and planning for land use.

The WFP has taken concerted action to promote self-reliance in the Kalobeyei settlement through two programmes: the Bamba Chakula and kitchen garden programmes.⁸

Bamba Chakula registered shop in Kalobeyei

Bamba Chakula

The Bamba Chakula programme is a cash-based intervention (CBI) designed by WFP as an alternative to in-kind food aid. By providing refugees with currency rather than material food items, Bamba Chakula allows recipients to choose the food items that suit their preferences while supporting the growth of local markets. The currency is only redeemable with registered Bamba Chakula traders, a constraint intended to allow the government to monitor the use of money transfers. For this reason, Bamba Chakula is not strictly speaking a cash transfer, but it does promote trade between recipients and registered traders, who can redeem Bamba Chakula credit received from transactions with customers for cash.

During data collection, there were about 55 Bamba Chakula traders operating in Kalobeyei, who also received training in business skills, financial literacy and food safety from WFP, in collaboration with the Danish Refugee Council and the Turkana County government. A 'fresh produce strategy' was implemented to engage suppliers of vegetables and other perishable food goods in Kitale, Mount Elgon, Narok, Nyeri

and other agricultural areas in Kenya, as well as small-holder farmers in and around Kakuma.

Food assistance strategies are different across the two sites: in Kalobeyei assistance is almost completely through Bamba Chakula, whereas in Kakuma beneficiaries receive a mix of Bamba Chakula and in-kind food aid. Refugees in Kalobeyei receive the equivalent of 1,400 KES (14 USD) per month per person, along with a small in-kind supplement of 1.2 kg of corn-soya blend (CSB), a nutritious powdered supplement used to make porridge. Meanwhile, Kakuma residents receive 500 KES (5 USD) per month for single person households ('size 1') and 300 KES (3 USD) per month per person for households of 2 or more ('size 2'), along with in-kind food aid that varies per month. Table 1 below compares the aid provided per refugee in each site.

Fig. 2 shows that, whereas food assistance in Kalobeyei is provided with high regularity, aid in Kakuma varies from month to month according to the constitution of the food basket. This reflects the availability of cash versus in-kind

	Kalobeyei Size 1	Kalobeyei Size 2 and above	Kakuma Size 1	Kakuma Size 2 and above
Monthly BC credit (KES eqv)	1,400	1,400	500	300
Daily BC credit (KES eqv)	45.9	45.9	16.3	9.8
Daily In-kind food (kcal, avg Mar 2016 – Mar 2018)	150 (CSB)	150 (CSB)	1,238	1,421

Table 1. Food assistance provision in Kalobeyei and Kakuma. All quantities (Bamba Chakula (BC) credit and kilocalories) are per individual. Whereas in-kind food aid in Kalobeyei is limited to a monthly distribution of 1.2 kg of corn-soya blend (CSB), in-kind food aid for Kakuma varies from month to month according to the availability of items in the food basket.

⁸ The kitchen garden programme is based on a collaboration between WFP, the County Government, the Department of Agriculture, and FAO.




Fig. 2: Monthly in-kind food rations in Kakuma camps

contributions received by WFP during the period of analysis. As with Kakuma, if donors were to reduce support for cash-based transfers, food assistance to Kalobeyei would be similarly reduced.

Kitchen gardens

Another important component of self-reliance in Kalobeyei is agriculture. This involves the household-based cultivation of farm plots located along the streams that run between the three villages. The space that will ultimately be available per household for cultivation in Kalobeyei is relatively low compared to sites in Uganda (Nakivale and Kyangwali) where we have previously worked, as indicated in Table 2 below.

Many refugees in Kalobeyei have been encouraged to cultivate small kitchen gardens in the open spaces behind their homes. Most gardens use the 'sunken plot' technique designed to grow vegetables in contexts of limited water: holes of about 45 cm are dug and filled partway with topsoil. The soil is mixed with manure and spread on top, creating a surface layer that prevents desiccation of the soil beneath. As of August 2017, UNHCR reported that 458 households had benefited from household kitchen gardens.10

This report

The aim of this report is to provide an overview of the insights offered by our initial data collection in the Kalobeyei settlement and the Kakuma camp. Our findings highlight the extent of the barriers to the aim of improving self-reliance in Kalobeyei. The situation of recent arrivals living in Kakuma is no less complicated. We identify ways to better promote self-reliance among refugees. Our regression analysis highlights some of the variables that correlate with self-reliance.

The structure of the report follows our conceptual framework. After explaining our methodology (Section 2), we organise our main findings in sections based on the five key dimensions of self-reliance: sustainable well-being (Section 3), economic activities (Section 4), access to public goods and aid (Section 5), access to markets (Section 6), and access to networks (Section 7). Next, we analyse, in their respective sections, how the variables of personal characteristics (Section 8) and environmental context (Section 9) relate to self-reliance. Finally, we conclude with policy recommendations.

	Square metres
Kalobeyei total agricultural allotment	6,170,000
Kalobeyei per capita allotment	154
Kalobeyei per household allotment	675
Nakivale per household allotment	2,500
Kyangwali per household allotment	5,000

Table 2: Distribution of agricultural and household allotments in Kalobeyei compared with Ugandan settlements

⁹ We were initially concerned that a slight decrease in the quantity of the food basket in September and a more substantial drop in October could have influenced the survey responses from Kakuma. However ,the survey was conducted from 12 September to 16 October, with 60% of surveys conducted in September and 40% in October. We therefore estimate that no more than 20% of respondents took the survey after receiving the dramatically reduced food rations in October.

¹⁰ In the findings, we report that few refugees are selling produce from their kitchen gardens, as the vast majority of produce is consumed by the household. It is worth contrasting this with the following news story that painted a more ambitious picture of Kalobeyei residents using their gardens for income. See http://gulfnews.com/ news/africa/kenya/kitchen-gardens-cultivate-bond-between-refugees-kenyan-hosts-1.2075692.

2. Methodology

We employ a participatory mixed-methods approach that includes survey questionnaires, semi-structured interviews and focus groups. Data collection took place over four months, from August to November 2017, in the Kalobeyei settlement and Kakuma camp. We focused on South Sudanese, Ethiopian and Burundian refugees in Kalobeyei, and on South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma, all of whom arrived after 2015. We also conducted focus groups and informal interviews with host community members in the region.

Key elements		
Mixed methods	- Our research combines quantitative and qualitative methods.	
Quantitative research	 We interviewed 2,560 adults from 1,397 households. Our sample included 1,106 South Sudanese recent arrivals living in the Kakuma camp, as well as 927 South Sudanese refugees, 250 Burundian refugees and 277 Ethiopian refugees living in the Kalobeyei settlement. 	
Qualitative research with refugees	 We conducted 15 focus group discussions and more than 20 semi- structured interviews with refugees of different nationalities, in addition to several interviews with non-refugee stakeholders. 	
Qualitative research with host population	 We conducted 8 focus group discussions and numerous informal interviews with host community members living in the vicinity of Kakuma and Kalobeyei. We also visited pastoral homesteads further afield, including Lokwamor, Abat and Oropoi. 	

We collected survey data on a representative sample of South Sudanese, Burundian and Ethiopian households whose members arrived in Kakuma and Kalobeyei after March 2015. In order to study intra-household dynamics, we not only interviewed household heads, but also the person who usually prepares the household food, and one additional adult randomly selected from each household. We will follow this representative sample of households and individuals over the course of three years.

Table 3 shows the percentage of households from different nationalities in Kalobeyei, Kakuma camps 1-3, and Kakuma camp 4. Refugees in Kalobeyei come mainly from South Sudan (71%), Ethiopia (13%) or Burundi (9%). Given that these nationalities represent 93% of the settlement population, we focused our research on these three groups. In Kakuma, we focused on South Sudanese recent arrivals, in order to compare their socio-economic outcomes with their fellow nationals living in Kalobeyei.

We targeted four strata: (1) South Sudanese recent arrivals in Kakuma (SSD - Kakuma), (2) South Sudanese in Kalobeyei

Country of origin	% Kalobeyei	% Kakuma 1–3	% Kakuma 4
South Sudan	71	52	86
Ethiopia	13	4	1
Burundi	9	4	5
DRC	4	6	3
Uganda	2	1	1
Sudan	1	6	5
Somalia	0	26	1
Population	37,392	145,300	21,130

Table 3: Refugee population from different nationalities (UNHCR data on 25 August 2017)

(SSD - Kalobeyei), (3) Burundian nationals in Kalobeyei (BDI), and (4) Ethiopian nationals in Kalobeyei (ETH). The two South Sudanese strata allow comparison across Kalobeyei and Kakuma. The remaining two strata allow us to look at diversity across nationality within Kalobeyei.

The contexts of displacement and arrival among these strata are diverse. South Sudanese refugees have been arriving in Kenya at a high but steady rate since the outbreak of civil war in late 2013. Due to previous periods of conflict prior to South Sudan's independence in 2010, forced migrants from southern Sudan have long constituted the largest demographic in the Kakuma camps, especially camp 4.

Ethiopians in Kalobeyei are mainly transfers, relocated when the government of Kenya made plans to close the Dadaab camps. While plans stipulated that Kalobeyei was not to include Somali nationals, many of the Ethiopian transfers are ethnic Somalis displaced from Ethiopia's Ogaden region due to conflict between government and secessionist forces. Others hail from the Gambella region in southwestern Ethiopia. Unlike South Sudanese new arrivals, many of the Ethiopian transfers had enough time to make a collective family decision on whether to move together to the new settlement. Finally, the majority of Burundian refugees fled political violence following the elections of 2016 in which President Pierre Nkurunziza rejected constitutional term limits and sought a third term. A failed coup attempt led to severe state repression and a sudden wave of displacement into neighbouring countries. Many of the Burundian refugees in Kalobeyei made their way through Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania with the intention of seeking asylum in Kenya.

In order to obtain a representative sample of households within each stratum, our initial plan was to use the UNHCR's registration list. However, this was often inaccurate for Kalobeyei. To sample in Kalobeyei, we therefore contracted a satellite imagery firm to capture an image of the two sites. From this, we randomly selected 10% of refugee shelters in Kalobeyei. The UNHCR data was more accurate in Kakuma, such that with some additional information on addresses from the National Council of Churches in Kenya (NCCK) we were able to continue with the original sampling strategy with the South Sudanese stratum in Kakuma.

In Kalobeyei, enumerators were provided with legible plans of the neighbourhoods, within which the locations of selected households were marked. We proceeded in two steps for the survey administration. An enumerator would visit the selected household to enquire about the languages spoken by household members, and their willingness to participate in the survey. If the household members consented to participate and the enumerator was proficient in one of the languages spoken by household members, the survey would be administered. If language was a barrier, the enumerator would report the case to the research team, and another enumerator with the appropriate language skills would be sent to this household to administer the survey.

In order to capture differences within households and across genders, we interviewed the head of household, the person responsible for preparing food, and one adult randomly selected in each household. Sampling weights are used throughout our analysis.

For the survey, we recruited 20 enumerators from South Sudanese refugee communities, ensuring that the balance of ethnicities was broadly representative of the areas where the


interviews were conducted. We also recruited four enumerators in charge of the Burundian and Ethiopian communities. Enumerators were trained for one week. The survey was carried out using the survey software SurveyCTO on tablet computers. The questionnaire was translated into Bari, Burundi, Dinka, Juba Arabic, Nuer and Somali.

We interviewed 2,560 adults from 1,397 households. In Kakuma, we interviewed 1,106 South Sudanese adults from 509 households. In Kalobeyei, we interviewed 927 South Sudanese adults from 629 households. A total of 74% of these households were selected using satellite sampling. We also interviewed 250 Burundian adults from 131 households, and 277 Ethiopian adults from 128 households. A total of 55% of Burundian households and 76% of Ethiopian households were selected using satellite sampling (Table 4).

	Total	Kakuma	Kalobeyei		
		SSD	SSD	BDI	ETH
Individuals	2,560	1,106	927	250	277
Households	1,397	509	629	131	128

Table 4: Overall sample size

We supplemented our quantitative data collection with qualitative research. This was important for questionnaire development and to elaborate on survey results. It also enabled us to explore lines of inquiry that could not be addressed through quantitative analysis, such as significant outliers (e.g. wealthy individuals who are not representative of the population) and the voices of under-represented populations (e.g. the host community around the Kalobeyei settlement). We used a range of data collection methods, such as transect walks, focus group discussions, semi-structured interviews and participant observation.



3. Sustainable well-being

Sustainable well-being encompasses subjective quality of life assessments, nutritional status, possession of necessary and desirable assets, and participation in leisure activities. This data provides a snapshot of refugees' living standards in Kalobeyei and Kakuma.

Key findings	
Subjective well-being	Refugees are generally dissatisfied with their quality of life in the camp.Burundian refugees in Kalobeyei report the greatest dissatisfaction.
Food security	 Food security is poor everywhere, although slightly better in Kalobeyei. Food diversity is low, especially for South Sudanese living in Kakuma. Consumption of fish and meat is low, except for Ethiopians. Consumption of fruit, eggs and roots is low for all groups.
Assets	 Asset holdings are very limited everywhere. Compared with those living in Kalobeyei, South Sudanese refugees living in Kakuma are more likely to own some key assets (bed, chair, table, television, radio). Ethiopian and Burundian refugees seem to be better off.
Leisure and social participation	 A large proportion of refugees, especially those from South Sudan, are part of a sports or recreational group. Relatively few refugees are part of community-based organisations, especially in Kalobeyei. Women are less likely to be part of a community-based organisation or a sports or recreational group.

Subjective well-being

The majority of refugees in our study report dissatisfaction with their current life (Fig. 3). Nevertheless, there are differences across nationalities, largely due to how refugees compare their pre-flight and post-flight standards of living. For instance, South Sudanese recent arrivals in Kakuma and Kalobeyei see their new life in Kenya as better than in war-torn South Sudan. Some Ethiopian refugees who were transferred from the Dadaab camp were disappointed with their living standards in Kalobeyei compared with those in Dadaab, as the following comment illustrates:

We are all very disappointed [with life in Kalobeyei]. Dadaab is much better than here [Kalobeyei]. In Dadaab, we had school and established livelihoods. UNHCR and the Kenyan government said Kalobeyei is a better place... They promised jobs, education, security, good hospitals. But none of them are here.




Fig. 3: Subjective well-being. Note: whiskers in all graphs illustrate 95% confidence intervals around the mean

Some refugees subsequently returned to Dadaab or moved elsewhere. Many young Ethiopians in particular did not like life in Kalobeyei, and, according to community leaders, those with access to remittances moved onwards to Uganda to seek a better life. In contrast, a number of Ethiopian refugees, particularly those from minority groups, suggested security was better in Kalobeyei than in Dadaab. One Oromo Ethiopian told us: 'Ethiopians were a minority in Dadaab. No one paid attention to us. Now we get some recognition here.'

Of all groups, Burundians in Kalobeyei are the least satisfied with life in the camp (Fig. 3). A number of reasons were put forward. First, a small proportion of Burundians in Kalobeyei – about 4% – were relocated from the Dadaab camp. Like Ethiopian refugees, they are disappointed by the poor living standards in Kalobeyei. Second, many of the Burundians in Kalobeyei compared their current situation with that of their counterparts in the Kakuma camp. Burundians in the Kakuma camp are well known for their technical skills and livelihoods: some are mechanics, drivers or carpenters and they are viewed as relatively well-off due to these livelihood opportunities.

Food security

Access to food remains a challenge in both sites. Refugees living in Kalobeyei eat on average 1.8 meals per day (Fig. 4). The situation is worse for South Sudanese recent arrivals living in Kakuma, who only eat 1.5 meals per day on average.




Fig. 4: Average number of meals per day

Most of our recent arrival refugees reported suffering from constant 'food deficit'. We measured food insecurity using the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS).¹¹ This scale scores respondents' perceptions of food vulnerability and the frequency with which shortages occur. Food insecurity is rife in both camps (Fig. 5), although the situation seems slightly worse in Kakuma. In Kalobeyei, 78.8% of South Sudanese refugees, 89.4% of Burundian refugees and 83.3% of Ethiopian refugees are classified as food insecure, compared with 92.4% of South Sudanese recent arrivals in Kakuma.




Fig. 5: Percentage of severely food insecure refugees

Regardless of nationality, in both camps, almost all refugee interviewees reported receiving insufficient food rations, including through Bamba Chakula. Cooking fuel provided by agencies is also insufficient. In one focus group with 16 South Sudanese new arrivals in Kakuma, participants reiterated the following sentiment:

Our [monthly] food lasts only 15–20 days. We usually have a small breakfast and eat supper in the evening... We often have to sell food for firewood. Now we get only one bundle [4 pieces] of firewood for one person [for two months]. This does not last two months.

Because of chronic food shortages, sharing food items with neighbours and friends is a common practice, but the frequency and scale of communal support is modest. One South Sudanese refugee reported: 'we sometimes share food, but we cannot rely on one another too much because no one has extra capacity to assist others. I feel guilty when I beg for support.'

Food insecurity often goes hand in hand with limited availability of specific food items. In order to measure dietary diversity, we applied the Individual Dietary Diversity Score (IDDS), 12 which measures the number of different food groups that individuals consume over the week preceding the survey (out of 12 food groups). The IDDS is a good proxy measure of the nutritional quality of an individual's diet. More generally, this indicator is expected to correlate with household socioeconomic level. 13

Diets are more diverse in Kalobeyei compared with Kakuma (Fig. 6). The diet of South Sudanese refugees living in the Kakuma camp is significantly less diverse than the diet of South Sudanese refugees from Kalobeyei. The higher diversity of the diet in Kalobeyei can be explained by the fact that all refugees in Kalobeyei receive food aid in the form of Bamba Chakula, which can provide more choices of food to refugees than in-kind food assistance. However, there was also a slight decrease in the size of the monthly food basket in Kakuma during the survey, which may account for some of the difference. Within Kalobeyei, the diets of Ethiopian refugees are much more diverse than others, and they consume more dairy products and meat.

¹¹ Coates, J., Swindale, A., and Bilinsky, P. (2007). Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS) for measurement of food access: indicator guide. Washington, DC: Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance Project, Academy for Educational Development, 34.

¹² Swindale, A., and Bilinsky, P. (2006). Household dietary diversity score (HDDS) for measurement of household food access: indicator guide. Washington, DC: Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance Project, Academy for Educational Development.

Headey, D., and Ecker, O. (2013). Rethinking the measurement of food security: from first principles to best practice. Food security, 5(3), 327–343.




Fig. 6: Dietary diversity: types of food eaten by respondents (Individual Dietary Diversity Score)

Food insecurity and dietary diversity are of course not independent: in our sample, the correlation between the IDDS and the HFIAS scores is equal to -0.2, indicating that higher food insecurity is associated with lower dietary diversity.

Refugees reported not having access to preferred food types, as they had had in their countries of origin. Table 5 summarises some of the desired items listed by nationality. Some of the food items listed, such as meat, are found in markets in the Kalobeyei settlement, the Kakuma camp and in town, but they are either not available at registered Bamba Chakula shops or, according to refugees, too expensive.

South Sudanese	Ethiopian	Burundian
Beef Chicken Meat (something like hamster common in South Sudan) Fresh fish Cabbage Bananas Fresh cows' milk Beans (certain types of beans available in South Sudan are not available in Kakuma or Kalobeyei) Cassava leaves Millet	Camel meat Camel milk Fresh fish Ghee (clarified butter) Bananas Mangos Oranges Lemons Cow peas Pumpkin Injera	Chicken Beef Cabbage Kale Fish Bananas Cassava leaves Matoke (plantain/ green banana) Sweet potatoes Millet Fresh milk

Table 5: Preferred food items by nationality

Our data also allows computation of the Food Consumption Score (FCS) developed by the WFP.14 This indicator is a composite score that aggregates information on dietary diversity, food frequency and relative nutritional importance. Previous research has shown that the FCS correlates well with caloric availability at the household level. $^{\rm 15}$ The FCS is a weighted sum of the number of days that the household consumes a series of food groups (staples, pulses, vegetables, fruit, meat and fish, milk and dairy, sugar and honey, oils and fats). Household consumption is then categorised according to the following scoring scheme: 'poor' when < 21; 'borderline' when > 21 and < 35; 'acceptable' when > 35.






Fig. 7: Dietary diversity: percentage of refugees eating these items

The FCS was highly correlated with the IDDS (coefficient of correlation = 0.62) and with the average number of meals eaten per week (coefficient of correlation = 0.3). It is therefore unsurprising that the FCS is significantly higher in Kalobeyei (average score = 41) compared with Kakuma (average score = 34). Only 58.5% of South Sudanese recent arrivals living in Kakuma would be classified as having an acceptable score

¹⁴ WFP (2008). Food consumption analysis: calculation and use of the food consumption score in food security analysis. World Food Programme, Rome.

¹⁵ Wiesmann, D., Bassett, L., Benson, T., and Hoddinott, J. (2009). Validation of the World Food Programme's Food Consumption Score and Alternative Indicators of Household Food Security. Intl Food Policy Res Inst.

according to this metric. In contrast, in Kalobeyei, 76% of South Sudanese refugees, 64.6% of Burundian refugees, and 73% of Ethiopian refugees would be classified as having an acceptable score.

Assets

Recent arrival refugees generally own very few assets (see Fig. 8 and Fig. 9). Only 0.7% of the households have a television, 0.9% own a computer, 0.5% own a generator, and 2.9% of refugees own a bicycle. We observed considerable variation across camps and nationalities. Ethiopians in Kalobeyei and South Sudanese in Kakuma – especially in Kakuma camp 1 – display higher ownership of certain assets. This can be explained by the fact that South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma arrived on average earlier than those in Kalobeyei, and Ethiopians carried some assets from Dadaab to Kalobeyei. The relatively poor asset profile of South Sudanese refugees in Kalobeyei may reflect their more recent arrival, but also that most of them were forced to flee their homes without advance notice. In a series of focus group discussions, South Sudanese participants reiterated: 'We fled in panic. Suddenly our village was attacked. We grabbed whatever was around us and ran away. No time to carry assets or money or even to meet family members.'

One asset owned by a substantial proportion of refugees (43.6%) across all groups is a mobile phone. However, we observed considerable variation across sub-samples. Ownership rates range from about 30% for South Sudanese refugees living in Kalobeyei, to about 50% for South Sudanese refugees living in Kakuma as well as Burundian refugees living in Kalobeyei, and 70% for Ethiopian refugees living in Kalobevei.

Leisure and social participation

A substantial proportion of refugees engage in non-economic activities, albeit with considerable variation across camps, nationalities and gender. In Kakuma, while about 75% of South Sudanese men participate in a leisure activity, only 18.7% of South Sudanese women do so. Participation rates are significantly lower in Kalobeyei: about 61% of South Sudanese men, and only 9% of women, engage in a leisure activity. The same gender imbalance emerges for Burundian and Ethiopian refugees living in Kalobeyei.

Football is by far the most popular activity, practised by 77% of those who report engaging in a leisure activity (Fig. 10). Volleyball, basketball, dancing and music are also relatively popular.

A small proportion of our recent arrival refugees are part of a community-based association (Fig. 11). Again, participation rates vary (1) across gender, rates being lower for women, (2) across sites, rates being lowest in Kalobeyei, and (3) across nationalities, rates being lower for Burundian and Ethiopian refugees. Youth groups, church groups and associations promoting access to health and education are the most popular 'community-based associations'.




Fig. 8: Household assets (percentage of refugees)




Fig. 9: Individual assets (percentage of refugees)




Fig. 10: Type of activities (percentage of refugees)




Fig. 11: Participation in community-based associations

4. Economic activities

Economic activities are themselves an indicator of self-reliance. But they also promote other aspects of sustainable well-being by enabling people to acquire assets and maintain a desirable quality of life, while mitigating negative feelings associated with idleness. While most refugees across the two sites are not engaged in economic activity, focusing on the exceptions offers insights into how to extend livelihood opportunities. Our analysis considers refugee employment or 'incentive work', as well as other activities that generate income or bring in resources, such as agriculture and animal husbandry.

Key findings	
Employment	 Most South Sudanese recent arrivals are jobless, both in Kakuma and Kalobeyei. The situation is less dramatic for Burundian and Ethiopian refugees.
Income	- The average monthly income from economic activities is extremely low.
Agriculture	 A substantial proportion of our sample is involved in agriculture, especially in Kalobeyei village 1. A majority of South Sudanese refugees are interested in being involved in agriculture.
Animal husbandry	- Very few refugees own animals.

Employment

Most recent arrivals in Kakuma and Kalobeyei are not engaged in any income-generating activities (Fig. 12). Regardless of their location, only a tiny portion of South

Sudanese new arrivals – less than 10% – are currently involved in economic activities. The situation is significantly worse in Villages 2 and 3 of Kalobeyei than in Village 1 and Kakuma.




Fig. 12: Engagement in economic activity

One of the South Sudanese community leaders who has been living in the Kakuma camp for many years, commented on livelihoods of the newly arrived South Sudanese refugees in the camp:

Most of them are relying on food rations. Very few are working. They often create a new family and put food together and share resources for survival... Many of them are not educated, especially women... Very few had a business background in South Sudan.

While most refugees in Kalobeyei do not have independent livelihoods, Burundian refugees are more likely than others to be involved in income-generating activities. Often, these Burundians have found employment through their fellow counterparts in Kakuma. Some Burundian refugees are employed at shops, butcher's shops, and bars in the Kalobeyei settlement, which were established by Kakumabased Burundians. Some Somali Ethiopian refugees in Kalobeyei have found similar ethnicity-based employment arrangements. Payment for such informal casual labour is usually very low.

The gender split in employment is almost 50:50 for South Sudanese in both sites, whereas paid employment is much less common among Burundian and Ethiopian women than men. Looking at the four Kakuma camps individually we saw that there is no statistical difference between the employment numbers across the camps. In Kalobeyei, however, people in village 1 are much more likely to be engaged in economic activities than those in villages 2 or 3.

The absence of economic activities has left many refugees feeling listless and dissatisfied with their life situations. When our team asked a male South Sudanese refugee in Kalobeyei who was entirely dependent on Bamba Chakula what he does during daytime, he replied: 'Nothing... Just talking to my neighbours, killing time every day... I feel so bored and so bad.'

As we explain later, the labour market is neither well developed nor competitive in either Kakuma or Kalobevei. Consequently, those with regular income-generating activities are a minority, about 80% of whom are actually working for Kenyan or international NGOs as incentive workers. The sectors in which people have found paid work (excluding agriculture) are comparable between the South Sudanese of either site. A quarter of the employed South Sudanese in Kakuma work as teachers and 18.7% are employed in the food industry, as brewers, butchers and bakers. Another 16.1% are shopkeepers and 8.3% work for community organisations. The employed South Sudanese refugees in Kalobeyei follow a similar pattern, with 20.8% employed in catering and 15.1% working as teachers. A little over 13% are shopkeepers and a total of 7.5% work for community organisations. The final two areas in which people are employed are different from those in Kakuma, with 9.4% working as security guards and 7.5% as health workers (Table 6).

Ethiopians are engaged in more entrepreneurial livelihoods than the South Sudanese, with almost 13% of surveyed Ethiopians owning a medium or large business and another 10% owning a small business. Education and community organisations are important areas of activity for Ethiopians as well, providing 15.8% and 10.5% of employment respectively. Health workers make up another 10.5% of the sample.

The Burundians are engaged in very different sectors than the other three groups. More than half of Burundians with an income-generating activity are small-scale entrepreneurs: 37.9% own a shop and another 20.7% work as boda boda (motorbike) drivers. The next largest employment group is catering and restaurants, in which 10.3% are engaged. Burundians are less likely to be incentive workers. This means the Burundians are less dependent on community organisations and NGOs than the other groups.

	Kakuma	Kalobeyei		
	SSD	SSD	BDI	ETH
1	Education services (27.4%)	Catering and accommodation (20.8%)	Retail and wholesale (37.9%)	Retail and wholesale (23.7%)
2	Food sector (18.7%)	Education services (15.1%)	Transport services (20.7%)	Education services (15.8%)
3	Retail and wholesale (16.1%)	Retail and wholesale (13.2%)	Catering and accommodation (10.3%)	Community organisation (10.5%)
4	Community organisation (8.3%)	Security guards/watchmen (9.4%)	Unskilled manual labour (8.6%)	Health services (10.5%)
5	Catering and accommodation (5.2%)	Community organisation (7.5%)	Food sector (5.2%)	Food sector (7.9%)
6	Transport services (3.9%)	Unskilled manual labour (7.5%)	Security guards/watchmen (3.4%)	Transport services (5.3%)
7	Security guards/watchmen (3.8%)	Health services (7.5%)	Community organisation (3.4%)	Security guards/watchmen (5.3%)
8	Unskilled manual labour (3.5%)	Food sector (5.7%)	Semi-skilled manual labour (3.4%)	Cleaners/housemaids (5.3%)
9	Milling (2.8%)	Other (3.8%)	Tailoring (1.7%)	Entertainment services (5.3%)
10	Beauty/Hair salon (2.8%)	Tailoring (3.8%)	Cleaners/housemaids (1.7%)	Tailoring (2.6%)

Table 6: Top ten paid work activities across the four sample strata. Note: the category 'food sector' includes brewery, butchery, fishery, dairy and bakery

Income

Income patterns differ greatly between the four groups. Income was only calculated for those with an economic activity, and it only takes into consideration the self-reported income from that activity. The overall median monthly income per worker is only 39 USD, with half of the population earning between 9 and 65 USD per month.

The South Sudanese in Kakuma have a low median income of 23 USD per month, meaning that half of the group earns less than this and the other half earns more than this amount per month. Half of the group earns between 6 and 55 USD per month. The data suggests that the South Sudanese in Kalobeyei earn more on average than those in Kakuma, with a median income of 40 USD. However, while they seem to earn more on average, no South Sudanese from Kalobeyei reported earning over 80 USD per month. But in Kakuma, our survey included five outliers – mostly shop-owners – who reported earning more than 150 USD.

The median income of Burundian refugees in Kalobeyei is equal to 22 USD per month. This income distribution is also heavily skewed to higher incomes: a quarter of Burundian refugees earn more than 65 USD. Most of these outliers are shopkeepers.

Ethiopian refugees in Kalobeyei have higher incomes than other groups. Their median income is equal to 65 USD per month. The Ethiopians on the lower end of the distribution are also faring better: only 10% earn less than 17 USD. Half of the Ethiopians earn between 44 and 78 USD every month. Four Ethiopians reported making more than 100 USD. All of them are shop owners.

A large proportion of those with jobs are 'incentive workers' serving as teachers, security guards and community mobilisers for the UNHCR and partner agencies. There are legal restrictions on the allowable monthly salary for incentive work, but refugees accept these positions because it is difficult to obtain a Class M work permit, which would allow them to receive a full salary. As the following statement from Hamdi, a 24-year-old South Sudanese refugee who arrived in 2016 and works as an incentive-based community health worker, shows, their wage is frustratingly low. He works six days a week from 8am until 1pm and earns 70 USD per month. He explained that his salary is not enough: 'I have to give up buying clothing and expensive food like meat. But I don't have any other options so I have to keep going.'

Our data therefore shows significant heterogeneity both within and between groups. The main common factor between the four groups is that for a large majority, incomes from their main income-generating activity are very low.

Agriculture

Interest in farming is strong, especially among South Sudanese new arrivals. About a quarter (26%) of our entire sample said that their household was involved in agriculture, all but one of whom had a kitchen garden (Fig. 14). This high rate of involvement masks significant heterogeneity across groups and sites. For the South Sudanese in Kalobeyei, more than 36% have a kitchen garden compared with only 6% of Ethiopians.




Fig. 13: Median income and quartiles (Middle lines illustrate the median. The top and bottom of the boxes are the quartiles. Whiskers show the outside values. Outliers are not shown in this box plot. 100 KES is approximately 1 USD.)

The South Sudanese in Kakuma and Burundians in Kalobeyei have similar pickup rates at about 20%.

The percentage of people with kitchen gardens also varies across sites, with only 13% cultivating in Kakuma camp 1 versus 27% in the other three Kakuma camps. The differences are starkest within Kalobeyei, with over half (54%) of people in village 1 maintaining a kitchen garden while only around 15% of people in villages 2 and 3 do so.

The produce harvested from the kitchen gardens is mainly used to supplement and diversify household consumption, with 84% of households consuming all of their harvest and another 12% consuming part of it. Of the 16% who did not consume their entire harvest, the large majority sold produce for money, while a small minority gave it away to friends or family.




Fig. 14: Involved in agriculture

The two main barriers to kitchen garden cultivation are lack of water and seeds, as noted by 95% and 78% of respondents, respectively (Fig. 15). Other important barriers are the lack of equipment (33%) and the poor quality of the soil (15%). There also seems to be an interesting difference between the two sites: the percentage of Kakuma interviewees who report any given difficulty is higher than that in Kalobeyei, a trend that holds across all 8 difficulties we identified in the survey.




Fig. 15: Barriers to agriculture

Of the households currently not involved in agriculture, a majority (54%) would like to be (Fig. 16). This feeling is especially strong among South Sudanese refugees, two thirds of whom would like to have a kitchen or a community garden. The strong interest in farming is largely related to their previous livelihoods in South Sudan. Many are from Bari, Acholi, Lotuko or Didinga ethnic groups in the Equatoria regions, where various forms of agro-pastoralism are prevalent. In one focus group discussion with 18 South Sudanese refugees living in Kalobeyei, one participant stood up and passionately expressed his interest in pursuing farming activities.

Farming is the best for us because we know how to do it. We much prefer farming to business. But here there are no good conditions for farming. No water, no land...We need external support. We are good at farming so we can make it [if good conditions are given].




Fig. 16: Percentage willing to be involved in agriculture (if not yet involved)

The main barriers that stop people from getting involved in agriculture are similar to the difficulties faced by those who are involved in agriculture. For instance, 94% of those who want to be involved mention the lack of water as a barrier to do so. The lack of seeds is mentioned by 80%, the lack of equipment by 36% and poor soil quality by 13%. Two other important barriers are the lack of training and not having enough space. Again, people in Kakuma report more barriers to getting involved in agriculture than people in Kalobeyei.

Some South Sudanese refugees, especially from Lotuko and Didinga ethnic groups, have experience tending to livestock. However, as in the Kakuma camp, refugees in Kalobeyei are not allowed to keep livestock (cattle, goats, camels) or other animals because of concerns it may fuel tensions between refugees and Turkana people living nomadic lives.

Ownership of animals is therefore low across the sample, with less than 6% of households possessing animals. Around 10% of South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma own animals, compared with just 2% of their counterparts in Kalobeyei. The two main types of animals that households keep are chickens and pigeons; the former is held by 3.6% of households and the latter by 2.5%.



5. Access to public goods

Refugees' access to public goods will greatly impact their self-reliance. Public goods include healthcare, education, water, sanitation, transport, security and aid. These goods may be provided by the state, international organisations, NGOs or community-based organisations. We analysed refugees' access to healthcare, water, education, and electricity. We also reviewed refugees' relationships with aid providers and their sense of dependency on assistance.

Key findings			
Access to healthcare	- Respondents report inadequate access to healthcare.		
Access to water	 Between locations, there is little variation in the average daily quantities of water fetched, but substantial variation in the average waiting time to collect it. Lack of water is a crucial barrier to agriculture. 		
Access to education	 Refugees report better access to education and training in Kakuma compared with Kalobeyei. Refugees in Kakuma are more likely to be in formal education than those in Kalobeyei. 		
Access to electricity	- Access to electricity is poor.		
Dependency on aid	 With the exception of Burundians, all respondents consider themselves very dependent on support from NGOs, and more dependent now than they were a year ago. 		



Healthcare

Respondents reported limited access to healthcare in both Kakuma and Kalobeyei (Fig. 17). A source of frustration for refugees in Kalobeyei was the limited number of clinics. Refugees must often wait in long queues to receive usually inadequate care. Consequently, a considerable number of refugees seek care in Kakuma; 11% of Kalobeyei residents who had travelled to Kakuma in the week preceding the survey did so for medical reasons. The host community also accesses health services provided by humanitarian agencies, and many similarly prefer the services offered in Kakuma. Although the Turkana County government has been constructing rural dispensaries since 2013, many remain unstocked and inadequately staffed.




Fig. 17: Average response to the statement 'I have access to affordable and good quality healthcare'




Fig. 18: Average opinion on the statement 'I have access to enough water'


Water

Lack of access to adequate water infrastructure is the biggest challenge for the residents of Kalobeyei, regardless of nationality (Fig. 18). Those who were transferred from Dadaab were the most critical of the poor access to water in Kalobeyei, reporting UNHCR's promise of better water. Lack of access to water in Kalobeyei has even sometimes been a source of conflict among refugees.

Households in Kalobeyei on average fetch water slightly more often than once per day, while those in Kakuma fetch water close to 1.5 times per day. In both locations, the average quantity collected is 60 litres per day, with some variation between 50 and 70 litres. Waiting times at the water source varies substantially depending on location: in Kalobeyei village 1 the mean waiting time is 26 minutes; in Kakuma camps 1, 3 and 4, it is around 40 minutes; in Kakuma camp 2 and Kalobeyei village 2, it is an hour; while in Kalobeyei village 3 the mean waiting time for water is over 80 minutes (Fig. 19).

Water shortages constrain agricultural livelihoods. While a considerable number of refugees are engaged in kitchen garden activities, almost all complained that their crop output is severely limited by lack of water. For households involved in agriculture, 63.7% cite lack of access to water as one of the main challenges. Over 600 of the surveyed households that are currently not involved in agriculture would prefer to be, but 94.8% cite lack of water as a barrier. Occasional water shortages also force refugees to use Turkana water

sources, including the hand-dug shallow wells (ng'akare in the Turkana language) that are dug in the riverbeds. This has resulted in tension between refugees and the host community, who believe that the refugees may be polluting their wells inadvertently.











While many in the host community are awaiting their own water infrastructure, they are currently sharing some of the facilities with refugees. In general, the Kalobeyei settlement has improved the local host community's access to pumped groundwater because these facilities did not previously exist. During the most recent drought in 2016, both the shallow wells and the old hand-pumps dried up, so many in the host community sought water in the settlement. In the past, they would have been required to walk long distances to Kakuma camp 3, or to one of the small settlements such as Locor Edome or Nakilekipus. Nonetheless, the host community sometimes feel that their access to water in the settlement is secondary to that of the refugees, and so they are keen to have their own water facilities, as specified in the 2015 Terms of Engagement between the national government and the local community.




Fig. 19: Average daily frequency and waiting times for fetching water across locations

Education

While UNHCR did open three schools in Kalobeyei, they are insufficient to accommodate all school-aged children in the settlement. The UNHCR and other agencies are all aware that schools in Kalobeyei are incredibly congested, and have acknowledged the imminent need for more and better educational facilities. According to refugee teachers in Kalobeyei, one classroom has to accommodate more than 300 students. The school is especially taxed because it must accommodate both refugee and host community pupils. Some Turkana informants indicated that they refuse to send their young children to the school, for fear that the understaffing of teachers will leave them unable to take care of so many children and ensure their safety. Some of



the refugee interviewees from South Sudan told us that their access to education has been significantly improved compared to their pre-displacement period in war-like South Sudan.

In the face of limited school facilities, some refugees have initiated informal primary and nursery schools for their children. For instance, one of our refugee survey data collectors has begun a primary school in Kalobeyei village 2. When asked why he started this school, the founder, a South Sudanese refugee, responded as follows:

Because there is no school in village 2. Our children have to walk a long distance to go to schools in village 1. It is better to start off by ourselves rather than waiting for help... All of our teachers are volunteers. At its peak, we had 400 students but now we have about 60 students with two volunteer teachers from South Sudan and Uganda.

In both locations we collected survey data on up to three children per household. In Kakuma 9.3% of households have at least one child over the age of five who is not attending school (Fig. 20). In Kalobeyei, on the other hand, this proportion is 21.4%. Nonetheless, overall 88.6% of children attend school.

Adult education is somewhat better, although there is a marked difference between Kakuma and Kalobeyei. In Kakuma, respondents on average agree with the statement 'I have access to further education or vocational training', whereas in Kalobeyei the average response lies somewhere between agree and disagree, with the average response in village 3 lying closer to disagree (Fig. 21). As indicated in Fig. 22, over half of all adult respondents in Kakuma are currently attending some form of formal education, whereas in Kalobeyei this is much lower: around 30% of South Sudanese, 20% of Ethiopians, and fewer than 5% of Burundians.






Fig. 20: Percentage of households with at least one out-of-school child




Fig. 21: Average response to statement 'I have access to further education or vocational training'




Fig. 22: Percentage of refugees attending school, college or university

Electricity

Electricity in Kakuma can be acquired through a number of means. Generally, agencies do not provide electricity as a service. Some refugees have access to solar devices that they can use to power lights or charge small devices like mobile phones. Additionally, private operators run kerosene and diesel-fuelled electrical generators. Some operators have over 100 customers who are neighbours, to whose houses they run power. A small minority of these operators possess a powerful enough generator to turn a profit, providing reliable energy to a large number of people in their vicinity. But many of the smaller-scale generator operators describe the business as a service to the community, explaining that they rarely receive more than a small profit, and that recurring machine breakages make the business more trouble than it would be worth as an income-generating scheme alone. Electricity is only available at certain times of the day because most generators need to cool down.

Access to electricity varies substantially by location, but in all locations access to electricity is low (under 10% throughout). The greatest level of access is in Kakuma camp 1, where 7.2% of households have access to electricity, whereas in all other areas access is between 2% and 4% (Fig. 23).

Dependency on aid

With few economic opportunities in Kalobeyei, the vast majority of refugees there depend, at least partly, on food rations from aid organisations. It is difficult to foresee how refugees will be able to reduce reliance on assistance. In an anonymous interview, a Kenyan officer of an aid agency articulated: 'self-reliance in Kalobeyei is unlikely to happen if things go as they do now.'

Both South Sudanese and Ethiopians respond to the question 'How dependent do you think your household is on support from UNHCR, WFP or any other NGO?' on average between 'completely' and 'mostly' dependent (Fig. 24). Burundians are the exception, generally seeing themselves as only 'somewhat' dependent on aid.




Fig. 23: Percentage of refugees with access to electricity, by both strata and location




Fig. 24: Dependency on NGOs for support



6. Access to markets

Sustainable livelihoods require adequate access to markets. These markets are essential for any economic activity: sales, employment opportunities and credit to start a business are all directly tied to markets. In this section, we analyse refugees' access to markets by examining the market for goods, the labour market, and the credit and savings market in Kalobeyei and Kakuma.

Key findings	
Market for goods	 Restrictions on registration of Bamba Chakula traders protects registered businesses from competition, however, this is sometimes to the detriment of other small-scale entrepreneurs wishing to enter the Bamba Chakula market. The cash economy seems to be more significant in Kakuma than Kalobeyei, perhaps in part due to informal sales of in-kind food aid to the host community for cash. There are informal restrictions on the goods that refugees can trade.
Labour market	 The labour market is almost non-existent in Kalobeyei: while a substantial proportion of refugees would like to work, they are unable to find a job or develop an economic activity. Most employed refugees are 'incentive workers'.
Financial market	 There is very limited access to formal credit. Some Somali and Ethiopian refugees have managed to use customary finance mechanisms to launch businesses.

Market for goods

Even though the Kalobeyei settlement is less than two years old, there are several commercial markets that have been developed through the efforts of the WFP and its Bamba Chakula programme. In this programme, refugees receive credit on their phones every month, which they can use at the shops of registered traders to purchase food items of their choice. The shop owners can then exchange that credit for cash. Given the size of refugee populations in Kakuma and Kalobeyei, the scale of Bamba Chakula is considerable. According to one WFP officer, 'the value of Bamba Chakula in Kalobeyei is about 50 million KES and in Kakuma 40 million KES per month.' This creates a significant market economy of Bamba Chakula; the same WFP officer explained that, as of November 2017, there are 55 Bamba Chakula traders in Kalobeyei, consisting of 29 from Kenyan hosts, 16 Kalobeyei-based refugees, and 10 Kakuma-based refugees. The low number of Bamba Chakula shops in Kalobeyei implies that their turnover is expected to be very large: about 1 million KES per month per registered trader.

Bamba Chakula offers greater flexibility than in-kind food aid. Refugees can select the food items they prefer from the registered Bamba Chakula dealers, allowing them to act as consumers rather than simply recipients. One Kakuma-based refugee described the old food distribution model rather negatively:

Food relief day comes once per month, and it is the most stupid day for refugees. People are treated like animals, sometimes beaten, and they have to put up with the jams and the fighting all for a little bit of food. Many of us use the cooking oil, but otherwise we usually sell the rest. You cannot eat maize every day for a month.

Advocating 'free market' principles, the WFP does not control the prices of Bamba Chakula items (it gives 'indicative prices' of wholesale items but they are not mandatory). This, in turn, fosters trade between Kalobeyei and Kakuma, as explained by one WFP officer in an interview:

Refugee traders tend to go and buy in Kakuma because of cheaper prices there. For example, Mesfin is a big refugee wholesaler in Kakuma camp. The owner is an Ethiopian refugee living in Kakuma 1. Many Bamba Chakula traders buy from them. [Due to free market competition,] some conflicts are emerging between hosts and refugee traders. Some refugees sell cheaper than Kenyan Bamba Chakula traders and this is creating animosity. Selling at cheaper prices helps refugee beneficiaries but may have negative repercussions.

Only registered Bamba Chakula traders can trade in the electronic currency to receive cash, so Bamba Chakula is exchanged in a restricted system that operates parallel to the cash market. This restriction of registered traders serves several purposes.

First, it ensures that the number of traders does not grow in a way that exceeds the demand for goods in the Bamba Chakula market. This, in turn, enables registered traders, who are themselves refugees, to make a sufficient profit.

Second, new businesses in Kalobeyei would not be able to compete with long-standing businesses in Kakuma without the restrictions. Unlike new arrivals in Kalobeyei, more established refugees in Kakuma often have strong business connections and access to the capital required to start new enterprises. Additionally, major wholesalers among refugees and the host community were some of the first to be registered as Bamba Chakula traders, allowing them to access the new market in Kalobeyei. Some refugee business owners in the Kakuma camps are actively investing in Kalobeyei markets. One aid worker who works in Kalobeyei expressed her concern that the continuing growth of markets in Kalobeyei may attract the attention of major business actors:

While we advocate a free market, we need to give protection for Kalobeyei markets. If big wholesalers from Kakuma or other places come to Kalobeyei, small traders will lose business immediately. They cannot compete with such large ones.

However, while the regulation of access to the Bamba Chakula market protects registered traders from large businesses, it also prevents smaller businesses from entering the Bamba Chakula market on their own. This is especially significant in Kalobeyei, where Bamba Chakula makes up most of the total economy. In Kakuma, refugees often trade their in-kind goods with the host community, receiving either cash or other resources such as firewood and charcoal. In this way, the in-kind food distribution programme supports the circulation of some cash. However, the ability to spend Bamba Chakula as one pleases means that many refugees do not engage in trade of goods for cash, and so the cash economy in Kalobeyei seems to be more limited. Whereas smaller-scale entrepreneurs may be able to try their luck in the cash economy of Kakuma, they would need official registration as Bamba Chakula traders to access the Kalobeyei customer base.

In this way, restrictions on the registration of Bamba



Chakula traders constitutes a trade-off: it protects registered traders from large, long-established businesses with which they cannot compete. But it may also prevent the emergence of 'locally grown' small-scale businesses in Kalobeyei, who are excluded from the Bamba Chakula market. Furthermore, some kinds of business are excluded altogether from Bamba Chakula registration. Butcheries in Kakuma complained that they are unable to get Bamba Chakula registration, and there are currently very few people undertaking this kind of business in Kalobeyei.

Despite the limited cash economy in Kalobeyei, a contingent of informal traders has emerged in a market area in village 1. The informal market area outside WFP market area includes shops run by urban Turkana entrepreneurs, refugees from Kakuma, and Kenyans from further afield.

Beyond Bamba Chakula registration, refugees also face restrictions on the goods that they can produce, due to explicit bans on refugee participation in particular sectors such as livestock or forest resources, which are protected activities of the host community. Female refugees have also been prevented from brewing alcohol.

Official livestock markets, with quality control and tax services from the County government, are available in Kakuma camps 1 and 3. Kalobeyei does not yet have an official livestock market. Currently, livestock is exchanged informally between herders and restaurant owners, who need meat for their businesses. However, the going rate for livestock is less than in the official markets in the Kakuma camps. A goat that sells for 3,000 KES in Kalobeyei may go for 4,000 KES or more in Kakuma. Some locals have expressed an interest in a Kalobeyei-based livestock sale yard because it would be closer to many communities than those in the Kakuma camps.

Many herders also fear that a new market in Kalobeyei might increase the threat of stock theft by giving thieves more of an incentive to steal. The County government has developed mechanisms to identify and discourage livestock thievery, including intra-ethnic theft as well as cross-border interethnic raiding. But these systems are imperfect, and herding communities on the periphery of Kalobeyei are concerned that the harm might outweigh the benefits. Within the pastoral community, markets tend to benefit livestock dealers (ng'imucuruz in Turkana) more than other rural pastoralists, some of whom use livestock more for subsistence and investment rather than short-term trading.


Labour market

We asked jobless refugees why they are not working, and their answers varied with gender (Fig. 25). A total of 43% of women reported that they are not employed due to childcare obligations and domestic work. Other women explained that they could not find work (26%) or that they are studying (12%). For men, 57% were studying, and 30% said they could not find work.

Very few refugees 'commute' to work (Fig. 26). Most South Sudanese refugees who have an economic activity are working in the same place they live. Ethiopian and, to a lesser extent, Burundian refugees are more likely to work in a different area than the area where they live.

Most employed refugees were hired by international organisations or NGOs (see Fig. 27). However, payment levels to these 'incentive workers' are restricted by Kenyan law. Although many of them work full-time, they are not given a full salary.








Fig. 25: Why are you not working?




Fig. 26: Percentage of refugees working in the same place they live





Fig. 27: Who employs you? (percentage of refugees)

Burundian refugees are an exception: 47% of employed Burundians are hired by a fellow national. Alsitde, a male Burundian refugee who lives and works as a boda boda driver in Kalobeyei, left Burundi in 2016 and arrived in Kalobeyei via Rwanda and Uganda later that year. He explained his work:

I went to Kakuma and asked around for any jobs amongst Burundian communities there. He gave me this work... [I mainly work] in Kalobeyei but I carry people between Kakuma and Kalobeyei very often... I pay 500 KES every day for renting a bike. Anything beyond is my profit. Sunday, all profit will be mine. I don't have to pay 500 KES as rental charge... I think half of the boda boda drivers in Kalobeyei are employed by Burundian refugees in Kakuma.

Just as many of the shopkeepers in Kalobeyei are hired by Kakuma-based proprietors, many boda boda drivers working in Kalobeyei are employed by Kakuma bike owners. The lack of small locally run businesses in Kalobeyei is also a limiting factor in the growth and diversification of the local labour market.





Financial market

One of the major challenges in building livelihoods for new arrivals in Kakuma and Kalobeyei is the lack of access to credit and finance. As shown in Fig. 28, 'lack of access to capital' seems to be the main barrier to the development of businesses in Kakuma and Kalobeyei. Less than a third of refugees think they could access a loan as little as 10,000 KES (about 100 USD) (Fig. 29). In fact, only 1.2% of interviewed refugees currently have credit from a bank, a microfinance institution, a private lender, or any friend or family member (Fig. 30).

In one focus group interview, with evident frustration, South Sudanese refugees described how hard it is to get access to financial loans in Kenya:

Here access to credit is very limited... During the civil war, we rushed to flee without carrying anything. Our first priority was physical survival. I could not go back to my shop [to carry savings with me]... I heard some NGOs are planning to give out some loans but I'm not sure about these schemes... I want to start a business but I have no means to start off. I was a business person in South Sudan. If I can get initial capital, I will be able to run a business to make money.

In the same focus group interview, a female South Sudanese participant stood up and commented as follows:

Even in South Sudan, I did not have savings. In rural Equatorial, there is very little access to banks... Also, I had to spend the little cash I had for transportation within South Sudan before reaching a Kenyan entry point.




Fig. 28: Barriers to economic activity (percentage of refugees)

During our qualitative research, we conducted a series of interviews with refugees from various nationalities both in Kakuma and Kalobeyei. Regardless of their living site and nationality, little access to cash or credit was identified as one of the significant problems preventing them from constructing their own livelihoods and seeking selfreliance. Aid organisations are aware of this issue. One NGO worker commented: 'Most refugees in Kalobeyei do not have savings or credit access. There are many refugees with good business ideas but they don't have access to capital.'

Compared to South Sudanese new arrivals, those who were transferred from the Dadaab camp seem to have slightly better access to financial resources. We interviewed Abdila, a Somali Ethiopian refugee who runs a non-Bamba Chakula shop in village 2 of Kalobeyei. She started her business selling household items in March 2017: 'UNHCR gave us 50 USD as relocation cost per person so I used it for business ... [In Dadaab] I was running a retail business selling vegetables, food items. I was always a business person in my life.'

Most entrepreneurs rely on their own savings or assets to set up their business (Fig. 31). Few of them have access to credit or support from their peers to obtain start-up capital.

Few refugees have access to bank accounts or M-Pesa, a mobile phone-based money transfer programme. In the Kakuma camp, for some groups of business-oriented refugees such as Somali and Ethiopian long-stayers, we observed the presence of informal finance mechanisms such as Ayuto, an Islamic community savings and social insurance mechanism - a type of rotating savings and credit association (ROSCA). However, amongst new arrivals in Kakuma and Kalobeyei, such initiatives have not yet widely developed. Burundian refugees are an exception, as 16.5% of women and 16.9% of men participate actively in a ROSCA.




Fig. 29: Do you think you could obtain a loan of 10,000 KES to launch a business, from a bank, a cooperative NGO or someone you know?




Fig. 30: Do you currently have a loan from a bank, a microfinance institution, a private lender or any friend or family member?




Fig. 31: What was the main source of start-up capital for this business? (percentage of refugees)



7. Access to networks

In refugee populations, forced displacement often results in expanded networks. Refugees rely on these networks for a variety of reasons, including employment opportunities, psychosocial support, and financial cooperation. In this section, we look at household composition, the role of remittances, communication technologies, and the mobility of refugees in order to understand how refugees in Kalobeyei and Kakuma are engaging with their networks.

Key findings	
Household composition	 There are fewer adults per household in Kalobeyei than in Kakuma. In both Kakuma and Kalobeyei, we observed that many South Sudanese refugees have spouses still living in South Sudan. Most respondents' siblings and children live in their country of origin or in the same camp. This is true for both sites and all nationalities.
Remittances	- The proportion of households receiving remittances is low, both in Kakuma and Kalobeyei. Burundians receive the least, whereas Ethiopians receive the most.
Communication technologies	Mobile phone ownership is quite common, especially for men.Contact by phone with refugees' country of origin is infrequent.
Mobility	 Travel between the Kakuma camp and the Kalobeyei settlement is common. Travel in Kenya and to the country of origin is infrequent.

Household composition

There is a marked difference in the number of adults in the typical household between Kakuma and Kalobeyei (Fig. 32). In Kakuma, the average South Sudanese household comprised about three adult members, whereas in Kalobeyei the average was less than two. This is influenced by a greater proportion of households in Kakuma with a large number (>10) of adults (Fig. 33). The median number of South Sudanese adults in Kakuma (three per household) is still larger than that of all nationalities in Kalobeyei (about two per household).

In Kakuma, additional adults in the South Sudanese households were often friends of the household head, although others might be spouses, siblings or adult children of the household head (Fig. 34). Among the South Sudanese in Kalobeyei, additional adults were most often spouses, siblings or adult children of the household head. Of the Ethiopians in Kalobeyei, additional adults were most often the spouses or children of the household head. Of the Burundians in Kalobeyei, additional adults were most often

the spouse of the household head. Thus, it was more common for non-related friends to form part of the household among the South Sudanese in Kakuma than among all other nationalities in Kalobeyei, where it was not frequent.




Fig. 32: Number of adults in household




Fig. 33: Number of adults in the household: median value, quartiles and outliers

For South Sudanese households, especially in Kalobeyei, our survey data shows a noticeably large proportion of female-headed households. In many of these cases, they were often forcibly separated from their husbands or other male adults while escaping from the civil war. Only half of the South Sudanese adults interviewed live with their spouse, whereas this proportion was much higher for Burundian and Ethiopian households (96% and 89% respectively). Of those South Sudanese who had a spouse not living in-camp, most of them remained in South Sudan: 71% for Kakuma and 79% for Kalobeyei (Fig. 36). For Burundians, on the other hand, this was 50%, and for Ethiopians, 21%. A non-negligible proportion of South Sudanese respondents - almost 10% do not know where their spouse is living.

The following response of Jilda, a South Sudanese refugee in her early 50s, illustrates the circumstances of many from her community. Her family was living in Equatoria and made a living from farming and animal husbandry. When asked how she fled from South Sudan, she responded:

Government soldiers suddenly came to our villages and started shooting. We started running away. I slipped and distorted my leg [she cannot walk without a stick]. I took my children and grandchildren with me. I could not meet my husband then... I don't know whether my husband is still alive or not.

Now she lives with her two children and two grandchildren and she is entirely reliant on Bamba Chakula. Jilda deplored how hard her household's life is in Kalobeyei as follows:

My husband was a breadwinner in South Sudan. If he were here, it would be possible [to survive in Kalobeyei] but without him, it is difficult. I do the kitchen garden but it is hard to get water here. With my injured leg and small children, there are not many options for us.

Like Jilda, many South Sudanese families were dispersed during the war. However, in some households, husbands or male mature adults chose to remain in South Sudan. In Nyalel's family, her husband stayed in South Sudan while sending her and their three children to Kenya: 'My husband was a government soldier. He was not living with us. He sent me and the children first to Kenya.'




Fig. 34: Interviewed adults' position in the household, relative to the household head (based on median for each segment)

We also learnt of some South Sudanese new arrivals, especially young males, who returned to South Sudan to seek economic opportunities there given their little access to meaningful work in Kenya. In addition, importantly, many South Sudanese families are polygamous; in our interviews we came across several families in which the husband stayed in South Sudan, often with another wife, while one or more wives fled with children to seek asylum.




Fig. 35: Spouse living in Kakuma/Kalobeyei (percentage of refugees)




Fig. 36: If alive but absent, percentage of spouses living in the country of origin

Given their history and context of displacement, it is understandable that a noticeable number of South Sudanese refugees both in Kakuma and Kalobeyei have family members who live separately from them. For South Sudanese households, having family members outside the camp/settlement is common. Some were forced to separate and others deliberately dispersed.




Fig. 37: Location of respondents' siblings (median number per segment)

The number and locations of survey respondents' siblings were remarkably similar (Fig. 37). The average number of siblings of respondents was between three and four for all locations and nationalities. For each stratum, the greatest proportion of these siblings lived in the country of origin: between 62% and 68%. The second-greatest proportion of these siblings lived in the same camp as the respondent: for South Sudanese in both locations this was 28%, for Burundians in Kalobeyei it was 16%, and for Ethiopians in Kalobeyei it was 20%.

In contrast, fewer than 10% of the adults interviewed in any strata had adult children (Fig. 38). For South Sudanese refugees living in Kakuma, adult children mainly live in South Sudan (53%) and in Kakuma (34%). For the South Sudanese in Kalobeyei, adult children usually live in South Sudan (69%) and some in Kalobeyei (25%).




Fig. 38: Location of adult children

Remittances

In refugee populations, forced displacement (and the response to it) often results in expanded networks, and in some cases family dispersal provides refugees with access to financial resources such as international remittances. Yet amongst our target populations in Kakuma and Kalobeyei, the percentage of those with remittance access is generally

Most respondents receive no remittances from their networks (Fig. 39). Of the South Sudanese, 11.7% of those living in Kakuma receive transfers from their networks, while only 6% of those in Kalobeyei do. A total of 13.4% of Ethiopians receive transfers, whereas just 1.2% of Burundians surveyed receive transfers. Of the respondents who received any remittances, the amount received varied: Ethiopians received the largest transfers, South Sudanese in both Kakuma and Kalobeyei received similar amounts, while Burundians received considerably less.

We confirmed this in a focus group discussion with (Somali) Ethiopian refugees, where participants commented: 'Maybe 10% of Somali Ethiopians receive money but they have to go to Kakuma to get money.'




Fig. 39: Percentage frequently receiving remittances

Although the number is small, some South Sudanese new arrivals do receive remittances from relatives in South Sudan. Grace, a 28-year-old South Sudanese refugee in Kalobeyei, is one of these exceptional cases. She runs a small business selling food items, which she began in 2017: 'my brother in South Sudan sent me 5,000 South Sudanese pounds [38 USD] from Juba'.

As the photograph below shows, her business is a so-called 'table shop' with few items for sale. With the equivalent of 38 USD, what she can do is limited. Very few recent arrivals from South Sudan have been permanently resettled in third countries. Therefore, the geographical distribution of their remitters is constrained to South Sudan or other nearby sites, which limits their remitting capacity.



Communication technologies

Refugees' ability to leverage the resources of their networks depends on their ability to communicate across space, which makes mobile phones a critical asset. Additionally, in Kenya, mobile phones can be used to transfer money. Our research found variation in mobile phone ownership. A majority of Burundian men and Ethiopian men and women own mobile phones, while ownership numbers were lower for Burundian women and South Sudanese men and women in both sites (Fig. 40).

Relatively few refugees are connecting with people outside Kenya. About 20% of refugees contacted someone in their country of origin in the past 30 days, but very few respondents contacted someone living somewhere other than Kenya or their country of origin. This means that most refugees are relying on their networks within Kenya. Email addresses are another way for refugees to connect with their networks; however, there are additional burdens in using an email address, such as accessing a computer and the internet, as well as literacy. According to our refugee research assistants, there was no internet cafe in Kalobeyei at the time of our research. Very few refugees, especially women, have an email address (Fig. 41).

Mobility

Freedom of movement is a fundamental human right and is central to the current framework of international refugee protection. In the last several years, there has been an increasing focus on refugees' mobility and migration in the global refugee regime. UNHCR now states that the enhancement of refugees' movement can actually




Fig. 40: Percentage owning a mobile phone, by gender




Fig. 41: Percentage with an email address, by gender

have positive impacts on their protection and can facilitate enduring access to sustainable livelihoods and meaningful economic opportunities for refugee populations.¹⁶

¹⁶ Long, K. and Crisp, J. (2010). Migration, mobility and solutions: an evolving perspective. Forced Migration Review, 35, 56-57.




Fig. 42: Travelled to another site in the past 7 days

There is frequent and constant movement between Kakuma and Kalobeyei (Fig. 42, Fig. 43). About 20% of respondents in Kakuma had travelled to Kalobeyei in the preceding 7 days, half of whom stayed in Kalobeyei overnight. On average, 33% of respondents in Kalobeyei had travelled to Kakuma, although fewer stayed overnight (32%). While movement between Kakuma and Kalobeyei is frequent, very few refugees travel outside this area. For example, only 3% of South Sudanese had travelled to South Sudan in the preceding year, whereas no Burundians or Ethiopians had travelled to their country of origin.

Some South Sudanese families move back and forth between Kakuma and Kalobeyei because they have family members spread across two sites. For example, James, a South Sudanese refugee who came to Kalobeyei in August 2016, regularly visits Kakuma to meet his relatives there:

I have some extended relatives living there. They arrived in Kakuma earlier than us. Almost immediately after the outbreak of war, they left South Sudan... My relatives are a bit better off so I borrow money and ask for support. We eat together often. They work as incentive workers so have some source of income... their financial situation is not easy so we cannot ask too much.

In the case of James, this inter-camp movement is part of a survival strategy that enables his family to access slightly better resources.

In addition to survival strategies, other refugees in Kalobeyei visit Kakuma to meet their national counterparts. For instance, Burundian refugees in Kalobeyei seem to visit Kakuma regularly, as indicated by this comment from a Burundian refugee:

We visited them [Burundian refugees in Kakuma] and asked how to survive in Kenya. We got some advice. We also join sports and football matches. There is intermarriage [between Burundians in the two sites]. Some of us are employed by Burundian refugees who started a business in Kalobeyei like a bar or boda boda.

In the Burundian community, ethnic and language bonds seem to play a key role in formulating refugees' livelihoods. Kakuma-based Burundian refugees began enterprises and employed their fellow Burundians living in




Fig. 43: (If travelled) Slept somewhere else in the past 7

Kalobeyei. For example, Jeffrey, a Burundian refugee has lived in Kakuma since 2010 but has opened a bar in Kalobeyei: 'This is a brand new site with fewer shops. I thought there is a lot of demand here ... Burundians and Turkana like drinking... [I employ] two Burundians'.

Some Somali refugees in Kakuma commenced a jointbusiness in Kalobeyei to explore this new market. One of the largest Bamba Chakula shops in Kalobeyei is co-owned by a Somali refugee in Kakuma and Madeline, an Ethiopian refugee in Kalobeyei. They met in Dadaab. Madeline explained:

It is a Bamba Chakula shop selling onions, eggs, potatoes, cooking oil, maize, rice, beans etc... It is a joint business with a Somali refugee in Kakuma. He set up this shop structure and I brought in food items... Many of [the items] are on loan credit from Somali Kenyan shops or Kenyan shops in Kakuma town like ALAMIN or other Somali shops. We negotiated buying on credit.

This is a good example of how refugees' new networks, built during exile, are carried over and utilised in their livelihood strategies. An Ethiopian refugee's Somali connections and trust with established Somali businesses in Kakuma have also contributed to enabling this large-scale business in Kalobeyei.



8. Personal characteristics

A refugee's previous experiences and personal background impact their ability to access opportunities and resources in Kakuma and Kalobeyei. In this section, we describe refugees' demographic characteristics, arrival date, education and household backgrounds in order to better understand the personal characteristics of the communities. We also run regressions on these characteristics to see which have the biggest effects on self-reliance outcomes.

Key findings	
Demographic characteristics	 Respondents are young, with median ages for all four national strata ranging from just 23 to 33 years. Three quarters of the South Sudanese adults in Kalobeyei are women. The Kakuma-based respondents were on average less likely to be married than those in Kalobeyei.
Arrival date	 Over 90% of South Sudanese living in Kalobeyei arrived after June 2016. Ethiopians living in Kalobeyei arrived in a concentrated period in 2017.
Education	 The South Sudanese in Kakuma had the highest education level of the four strata, with an average of five years of education. Though formal education attainment is low, there seems to be quite an uptake of vocational training in both sites. Reflecting arrival time, Swahili proficiency is higher in Kakuma.
Household background	- Whereas Ethiopians most often had business backgrounds, the South Sudanese and Burundians were from rural backgrounds.

Demographic characteristics

Our survey involved adults aged between 18 and 65. The youngest interviewees were the South Sudanese living in Kakuma, with a median age of just 23 (Fig. 44). Only 5% of this subsample are over the age of 42. In Kalobeyei the South Sudanese are slightly older, with a median age of 27. Three quarters of this subsample are below the age of 33. Burundians are older still, as their median age is 29. Ethiopians form the oldest group in our sample, with a median age of 33.

Perhaps surprisingly, three quarters of South Sudanese adults living in Kalobeyei are female (Fig. 45). In all other strata, women make up about half of the sample. As highlighted in Section 7, a considerable number of South Sudanese households living in Kalobeyei are female-headed due to forced or deliberate separation from their husbands. South Sudanese refugees living in Kalobeyei are also more likely to be widowed, as more than 10% have lost their partner (Fig. 46). More generally, the marital status of respondents varies greatly




Fig. 44: Age of respondents: median value, quartiles and

across the four groups. Whereas only 40% of the South Sudanese in Kakuma are married, 60% of the South Sudanese and Ethiopians in Kalobeyei and more than 70% of Burundians are married.




Fig. 45: Gender

Arrival date

Since our survey focuses on recent arrivals to the sites, it is unsurprising to find only small variations in their selfreported date of arrival. The South Sudanese in Kakuma arrived longest ago, with half the sample reporting dates between March 2015 and April 2016. The fact that one quarter of our sample in Kakuma arrived before March 2015 highlights that many South Sudanese recent arrivals are living in Kakuma with family members or peers who settled much earlier in the camp. The bulk of arrivals in

Kalobeyei are, unsurprisingly, from mid-2016 onward. Over 90% of the South Sudanese state an arrival date after June 2016, and they seem to have a fairly constant flow of new arrivals over time.

By contrast, the arrival of Ethiopians was very concentrated, 77% of them arriving during the first three months of 2017.17 In late 2016, after the announcement of the Dadaab camp closure and the transfer of Somali nationals across the border to Somalia, the UNHCR and the Kenyan government began relocating non-Somali refugees from Dadaab to Kalobeyei. Most of them made a proactive decision to move to Kalobeyei and had more time to prepare themselves. This is not true for most of the South Sudanese, who were forced to leave their own town or village due to unexpected violence and attacks during the war period.

The arrival of Burundians living in Kalobeyei was also concentrated, most arriving during the first half of 2017. They typically moved out of Burundi in 2014 and 2015 and usually first fled to Uganda, Rwanda or Tanzania. According to our interviews, some Burundian refugees lived in Uganda or Tanzania for a long time but left their asylum country due to mounting concern over being sent back to Burundi. The vast majority of those who were transferred from Dadaab came to Kalobeyei in early 2017.




Fig. 46: Marital status

¹⁷ It is important to note that the arrival dates considered here are self-reported and not obtained from official UNHCR data. Outliers can therefore be explained by the fact that some respondents reported their arrival date in Dadaab.




Fig. 47: Arrival date of respondents: median value, quartiles and outliers

Education

Regardless of refugees' nationality across the two sites, the education level of refugees appears to be limited (Fig. 48). The South Sudanese in Kakuma report having completed five years of education on average, the highest of the four strata. However, over a third still say they have not completed a single year of education. Their counterparts in Kalobeyei have finished just 3.4 years and over half have not finished a single year. According to our interviews with South Sudanese new arrivals, a large proportion of refugees from South Sudan in Kalobeyei are from Bari, Acholi, Lotuko or Didinga ethnic groups in Equatoria regions. In these regions, many have been working as farmers with limited access to education. Women especially tend to stop schooling at an early age and engage in household activities or get married. The Burundians and Ethiopians have completed 3.9 and 4.2 years of education respectively and 37% and 52% respectively have never attended any education. For each group, around 20% of people have completed eight or more years of education.

Though formal education attainment is low, there seems to be quite an uptake of vocational training. A full 23% of Burundians have completed vocational training; for the other groups this number lies at around 13%.

Our survey also asked respondents to rate their proficiency in speaking and understanding Swahili and English (Fig. 49), two of the lingua francas of the area. Of the South Sudanese in Kakuma, half speak no Swahili and another 40% understand and speak it a little. In Kalobeyei attainment is much lower, with 81% not speaking it at all and only a handful speaking it well or very well. Ethiopians in Kalobeyei follow a similar pattern, 70% don't understand Swahili and 26% speak it a little. Proficiency in Swahili is much higher among the Burundians – unsurprisingly given that the language is spoken in certain parts of their country of origin – with 28% not understanding it at all and over a third speaking it well or very well.

The proficiency in English is quite the opposite, with 84% of Burundians unable to speak it and only 4% able to speak it well or very well. The South Sudanese in Kakuma are more proficient in English, with equal amounts (around 33%) of people saying they do not speak it at all, speak it a little, or speak it well or very well. In Kalobeyei, around 57% of South Sudanese and Ethiopians speak no English.




Fig. 48: Education and skills




Fig. 49: Language proficiency

Household background

A majority of recent arrivals from South Sudan and Burundi are from a rural background. About 80% of them were typically engaged in farming, cattle keeping and some fishing as their central livelihoods before displacement. Most of them seem to be from relatively lower socio-economic status. During our group interviews, we asked whether they had savings in their pre-displacement time in South Sudan. One response was: 'We had no savings. Even in South Sudan we were not wealthy.' In contrast to other refugee groups, only 33% of Ethiopian refugees were involved in agriculture before displacement. They tend to have a businessoriented background. Many of them, especially Somali Ethiopians, had their own enterprises in Dadaab, which they developed over years of exile there (Fig. 50).




Fig. 50: Background before displacement

Preliminary regressions

Preliminary regressions show that personal characteristics are correlated with economic and consumption indicators (Table 7). Skills are an important determinant of employment. The likelihood of having an economic activity increases with refugees' years of education. Similarly, refugees are more likely to have an economic activity if

they have done some vocational training in the past and if they speak Swahili. In contrast, education and language proficiency do not affect the likelihood of being engaged in agricultural activities. Refugees are more likely to have a kitchen garden if they were involved in agriculture before displacement (correlation = 0.13).

	(1) Has a job	(2) Kitchen garden	(3) Dietary diversity	(4) Food consumption score	(5) Food insecurity
Female	-0.0146 (0.0162)	0.0262 (0.0206)	0.205*** (0.0752)	1.518** (0.626)	-0.706 (0.679)
Age	0.0159*** (0.00298)	0.00256 (0.00432)	-0.0362 (0.0223)	0.229* (0.128)	-0.152 (0.0966)
Age squared	-0.000185*** (0.0000393)	-0.0000414 (0.0000560)	0.000446 (0.000314)	-0.00301* (0.00172)	0.00232* (0.00130)
Years of education	0.00854*** (0.00273)	-0.00153 (0.00338)	0.0137 (0.0121)	0.0423 (0.0906)	0.0102 (0.0696)
Vocational training	0.127*** (0.0274)	0.0152 (0.0278)	0.128 (0.101)	0.171 (0.959)	-1.901*** (0.621)
English	0.0274 (0.0218)	0.0323 (0.0321)	-0.00328 (0.106)	1.860** (0.879)	-0.498 (0.717)
Swahili	0.0866** (0.0340)	0.0157 (0.0381)	0.355*** (0.120)	2.060* (1.070)	-1.310 (0.940)
Arrival date	-0.0000147 (0.00001)	0.000024*** (0.000008)	-0.0000201 (0.00006)	-0.00000247 (0.0005)	0.000778** (0.0003)
Kitchen garden			0.370*** (0.0788)	1.580*** (0.605)	-1.181*** (0.430)
Job			0.640*** (0.129)	3.531*** (1.132)	-3.685*** (0.853)
SSD Kakuma	-0.0143 (0.0153)	-0.123*** (0.0325)	-0.747*** (0.0833)	-6.495*** (0.679)	2.516*** (0.456)
BDI Kalobeyei	0.138*** (0.0309)	-0.181*** (0.0431)	0.160 (0.131)	-1.921 (1.259)	4.282*** (0.660)
ETH Kalobeyei	0.0298 (0.0220)	-0.306*** (0.0311)	1.659*** (0.199)	4.571*** (1.680)	0.122 (0.665)
Constant	0.0546 (0.247)	-0.211 (0.212)	5.661*** (1.379)	32.79*** (10.16)	2.601 (7.127)
Observations	2,518	2,484	2,484	2,484	1,443
R-squared	0.125	0.070	0.219	0.100	0.097
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Coefficients of OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses.					

Table 7: Preliminary regressions

Regressions show that refugees have a more varied diet if they are involved in agriculture and/or have an economic activity. Female refugees also tend to eat more types of food. The diet of Kalobeyei residents is significantly more diverse, especially for Ethiopian refugees.

Food insecurity is more pronounced for those without an economic activity and those not involved in agriculture. South Sudanese refugees living in Kakuma are significantly more food insecure compared with their counterparts living in Kalobeyei. Burundian refugees also appear to be more food insecure.

Previous experiences and personal backgrounds are key factors shaping people's capacities to access opportunities and resources in places like Kakuma and Kalobeyei. Therefore, differences in the demographic characteristics of the populations across these areas could have important effects on self-reliance outcomes. In Kalobeyei, more of the households are headed by women who have childcare responsibilities, which may limit their ability to devote time to economic activities. Time since arrival is of obvious significance, as reflected in the English and Swahili language skills among the longer-term residents of Kakuma; Burundians in Kalobeyei have superior Swahili skills but this is because Swahili is spoken in certain parts of their country of origin. Education levels are overall low across both locations, but especially in Kalobeyei. Most of the South Sudanese and Burundians have agricultural backgrounds, which should be taken into account when planning for self-reliance activities. Ethiopians on average have more experience in business, but some are also pessimistic about the prospects for business in Kalobeyei.





9. Environment

The opportunities and resources available to refugees in Kalobeyei and Kakuma are shaped by their environment. The physical environment, such as the weather, soil and general location of the sites, has an impact on what economic activities are possible. The regulatory environment further shapes self-reliance outcomes, as refugees must act in response to this structural barrier. The environment is influenced by the other people with whom refugees interact regularly: host communities, NGO workers, and government officials.

Key findings	
Living environment	 The physical environment in Kakuma is not conducive to business or agriculture. Kalobeyei-based refugees prefer living in the new settlement rather than in the Kakuma camp. Similarly, refugees living in Kakuma would not want to move to Kalobeyei.
Relationship with the host community	 Interpersonal refugee-host relations in Kalobeyei are yet to fully develop. Bamba Chakula may negatively affect trade with Turkana. Many negative perceptions and stereotypes between refugees and hosts remain unaddressed. Relations between refugees and different groups in the host community vary.
Regulatory environment	 Given the emergency situation triggered by the recent flows of arrivals from South Sudan, regulatory constraints imposed on refugees in Kakuma were transposed to Kalobeyei. Refugees in Kalobeyei cannot move freely outside the settlement. Refugees do not own the plot of land where they live, nor the fixed assets they build on the land.

Living environment

Kakuma and Kalobeyei are in Turkana County in north-west Kenya, a historically marginalised area approximately 1,000 km from Nairobi. Far from large commercial hubs, the area has long been excluded from major investments or development activities by the Kenyan government, private enterprises or international agencies. ¹⁸ Because of the arid climate, scarcity of water and poor soil quality, the inhabitants of Turkana County have been limited to drought-resistant sorghum varieties of crops, which can be cultivated seasonally along rivers to supplement livestock-based livelihoods. However, local livelihoods are diversifying with the rise of small urban centres, such as Kakuma Town.

Most refugees both in Kakuma and Kalobeyei have visited the other location and know something about the lives of the people who live there. Interestingly, while refugees




Fig. 51: Preference between Kakuma and Kalobeyei

openly convey the challenges of life in their own locations, Kalobeyei-based refugees report that they prefer the new

¹⁸ Crisp, J. (2000) A state of insecurity: the political economy of violence in Kenya's refugee camp, *African Affairs*, 99: 601–632. Ohta, I. (2005) 'Coexisting with cultural "others": social relationships between the Turkana and the refugees at Kakuma, Northwest Kenya, In *Pastoralists and their neighbbours in Asia and Africa*, (eds) Ikeya, K. & Fratkin, E., Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology. (Senri Ethnological Studies), 227–239

settlement to Kakuma, and vice versa for those based in Kakuma (Fig. 51). The following is a typical reaction from a refugee living in Kalobeyei:

I like Kalobeyei better. I heard the amount of Bamba Chakula in Kakuma is smaller than here. Kakuma is more insecure... Kakuma has better markets and things are cheaper there. Kakuma has more clinics. But it is so congested. Kalobeyei is more spacious and we have fresh air.

Nonetheless, refugees in Kakuma generally see their own standard of living as higher than that of residents of the Kalobeyei settlement. People often cite better social service facilities and lively economies in Kakuma. In one interview, a South Sudanese refugee leader in Kakuma commented as follows:

We have no interest in living in Kalobeyei. We heard that in Kalobeyei, there is no water and very few schools. It is a tough condition... We heard that in Kalobeyei we will be integrated like Kenyans. But we don't want to be Kenyan citizens. One day, if the civil war is over, we want to return to South Sudan.

When asked about their primary challenges, South Sudanese refugees living in Kalobeyei are more likely to criticise poor access to social services and the poor quality of housing (Fig. 52). By contrast, South Sudanese refugees living in Kakuma tend to complain about the weather and high prices. South Sudanese Kakuma residents are also more likely to report police harassment.




Fig. 52: Main difficulties associated with living in Kakuma/Kalobeyei (Percentage of refugees)

Relationship with the host community

Relationships with local host populations are a key factor shaping refugees' lives and livelihoods in exile. However, assessing host-refugee relations is somewhat complicated by the ambiguity surrounding the term 'host community' in Kenya. Officially, the term covers all Kenyans living in the vicinity or otherwise affected by the presence of the

camp. For many refugees, however, the term indicates the local Turkana people, an ethnic group that makes up most of the population in the county where Kakuma is located. More narrowly, many refugees use the term to refer specifically to 'traditional' Turkana, meaning those who practise pastoral and often semi-nomadic livelihoods. Analysis should consider how refugees' relations with urban and pastoral hosts may differ.

Refugee interactions with the local Turkana people include trade in locally procured goods (charcoal, firewood, construction materials, etc.), living in close proximity to one another, and even intermarriage (especially between the South Sudanese and Turkana). In Kakuma, while there are points of both compatibility and conflict, there is an overall image of mutual benefit. A recent World Bank study in Kakuma remarks 'how vibrant the economy is and how refugee-owned businesses also serve host communities'. 19 Some Turkana people are employed by (Somali and Ethiopian) refugees, especially in Kakuma camp 1, and some refugees have taken in children from impoverished Turkana families on a foster basis.

Because most refugees in Kalobeyei arrived more recently than in Kakuma, relationships that require long-term interaction are rare in Kalobeyei. The example of intermarriage is striking. As indicated in Fig. 53, marriage between the South Sudanese and Turkana is much rarer in Kalobeyei than in Kakuma, reflecting the longer timespan over which Kakuma refugees have been living among Turkana people.




Fig. 53: In your block, is there another refugee married to a Turkana?

Marital relations between Turkana and South Sudanese migrants are less common in Kakuma camps 3 and 4 than in camps 1 and 2 due to the duration of establishment of the camps. According to Turkana informants, marriage between Turkana women and South Sudanese men was once common in Kakuma, and many Turkana women even departed to Sudan with their husbands during the interim peace at the end of the Sudanese Civil War in 2005. However, South Sudanese men were less willing to allow women from their families to be married to Turkana, and this lack of reciprocity resulted in a general deterioration of marital relations after the next influx of South Sudanese refugees in 2012 during the post-independence civil war. Turkana focus group discussants in Lokwamor described the negative sentiment between themselves and South Sudanese refugees:

¹⁹ Sanghi, A et al (2016), "Yes" in My Backyard?: The Economics of Refugees and Their Social Dynamics in Kakuma, Kenya (Washington DC: World Bank)

They [the South Sudanese] want Turkana women but they don't want the Turkana men to marry their daughters. We don't know why they are doing that. Maybe their government requires them to be this way. Even if a Turkana man and a refugee girl decide to get together, her parents, brothers and other relatives will not allow it. They would even kill a Turkana man if they would find him in a relationship with their daughter... The UN should tell them that if the refugees want to marry from Turkana, then they should also expect the Turkana to marry from them.

South Sudanese refugee marriages with Turkana still occur, but at a lower rate than before. There are also marriages between Turkana and Somalis in Kakuma, but Turkana men are generally only allowed to marry Somali women if they first convert to Islam. This has become a point of contention, as suggested by interviews with Turkana men from Naabek village, near the UNHCR compound:

Somalis are not bad. They sometimes intermarry with the Turkana and they would therefore allow their daughters to get married to the Turkana men who are Muslims... If you don't want to convert, then you will never marry from them... When we realised that these people are not social, we asked if the UN is the one failing to tell these people how to live together with the Turkana.

Economic exchange between refugees and pastoral Turkana communities has also evolved over time. In the Kakuma camp, Turkana people have long provided firewood, charcoal and prosopis tree cuttings (used to construct fences) in exchange for maize flour, legumes and cooking oil that refugees received as in-kind food aid. But in Kalobeyei, two factors have altered this exchange. The first relates to supply: because Kalobeyei refugees are provided with Bamba Chakula, they can purchase the cooking ingredients that they desire, leaving them without a supply of unwanted ingredients with which to barter. The second issue relates to demand: many refugees in Kalobeyei do not require Turkana assistance in procuring forest resources. Whereas many of the Somali and Ethiopian households in Kakuma camp 1 were happy to pay Turkana people to procure firewood, the Lotuko and Didinga people of South Sudan, who are more populous in Kalobeyei (and who live a similar lifestyle to the Turkana), are more accustomed to the local plant varieties, and are capable of obtaining their own. Some Turkana informants indicated that these groups do not heed their warnings not to take resources from outside the settlement boundaries.

Moreover, there is some resentment that the refugees receive Bamba Chakula while Turkana locals do not. Many impoverished inhabitants of Turkana County do receive cash transfers from the nationally implemented but internationally funded Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP), or Lopetun in the vernacular used by Turkana communities. However, whereas refugees universally receive Bamba Chakula, with the amount varying proportionally to household size, Turkana are either included or excluded from the HSNP based on socio-economic indicators assessed by the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA), as well as their inclusion in risk categories such as the elderly (ng'ikaskou in Turkana), orphans (ng'ikokiok), or the disabled (ng'ikang'ualak). Many




Fig. 54: Opinions of refugees on Turkanas: Are the Turkanas...?

Turkana feel excluded from the more inclusive cash transfer programme structure from which refugees benefit.

As noted above, while the 'host community' is not monolithic, many refugees in Kalobeyei hold stereotypical perceptions of the Turkana as pastoralists, due to limited direct interaction with them (Fig. 54). Most refugees do not consider them to be good or trustworthy. Refugees see the Turkana as culturally different. They do not currently feel integrated with them. Only half of our sample, however, think that integration with the Turkana is important. One Burundian refugee in Kalobeyei commented on the refugeehost community relationship as follows: 'Our interaction is just trade. We are buying firewood and charcoal from them. We sometimes sell food items to them.' However, his statement pertains primarily to rural pastoralists, who are the main purveyors of locally procured cooking fuels.

In a focus group discussion with 16 Ethiopian refugees in Kalobeyei, participants described their negative conceptions of the Turkana host community:

[Turkana are] very hostile people. Many of us were attacked by Turkana when we picked up dead wood on the ground [to be used as firewood]. They threatened us many times! They said 'This is our land. Refugees should contribute to us.'

Urban Turkana, on the other hand, have generally positive relations with refugees. Turkana and other Kenyan registered merchants sell their goods and wares alongside refugees at the WFP market in Kalobeyei, and many Turkana people have recognised that the refugee camps and settlements create economic opportunities that would not otherwise be available. In the words of one urban Turkana youth leader, 'There will be no problems as long as they stay in the land we gave them without spreading further. It will also be good if there will be no conflicts arising from them.' However, job prospects have been a contentious issue, insofar as many urban Turkana men feel that the employment opportunities have fallen short of what was promised when the Natukobenyo land was signed away for the implementation of the Kalobeyei settlement. As a group of men described in a focus group in Kalobeyei town, the closest pre-existing village to the new Kalobeyei settlement:

When the UNHCR was building the school, a Turkana man was employed as a security officer to look after the materials. But when the school was complete, a fence was put around the school and the organisation fired this man, a Turkana. They then hired a refugee to take his place. That's what happened at the Kalobeyei dispensary, and at the offices here. Locals are often employed initially as guards, but they are later replaced by the refugees after fences are erected.


Relatedly, one staff member of the UNHCR partner agency in Kalobeyei described the perception of the Turkana communities towards refugees in Kalobeyei.

Host people are frustrated. They think refugees are getting many benefits but not locals... Many local leaders think UNHCR did not deliver what they promised to do in Kalobeyei. They are now quite sceptical [of the Kalobeyei settlement].

Nonetheless, while local people are frustrated that the benefits of the Kalobeyei settlement - including employment opportunities, infrastructural development and business opportunities - have been much more modest than expected, they generally get along well in their daily interactions.

The core element in KISEDP is integration between refugees and host populations. Yet integration requires understanding, and misperceptions between communities abound in Kalobeyei. As Turkana informants suggested in a focus group in Kalobeyei settlements:

There is a strange practice by the refugees whereby the refugees breed flies in bottles. They put a rotten substance in the bottle and then hang it on a tree outside their house or they would hang it in their houses. The flies breed in



the bottles and they would later release the dirty flies. It is a common practice by the Congolese.

The practice described is actually a method of exterminating annoying flies, but as distant observers, some Turkana people interpreted the practice as a breeding technique and perhaps a method of sending disease to Turkana communities. Such misinterpretations could be countered by sensitisation meetings.




Fig. 55: Refugee-host interactions

While misunderstandings abound, it is possible that business, religious and sports activities may provide an opportunity for community-building. Fig. 55 shows that business and personal exchanges between refugees and Turkana are significantly more likely in Kalobeyei. As indicated in Fig. 56 below, refugees reporting Turkana attendance at their religious gatherings is low but non-negligible in both Kalobeyei and Kakuma. Similarly, about 10% of South Sudanese refugees across both locations report that a Turkana is part of their leisure group, usually their football team (Fig. 57). Further research may investigate the ways that religious gatherings and sport activities foster productive inter-community encounters.




Fig. 56: Turkana presence in religious activities




Fig. 57: Turkana presence in leisure activities

Regulatory environment

Kalobeyei is based upon agreement between national and international stakeholders to promote self-reliance for refugees, while benefiting the host community. However, in response to the rapid and overwhelming influxes of refugees from South Sudan, aid organisations have been forced to assist new arrivals under the auspices of 'emergency provision'.

Many of the regulatory constraints imposed on refugees in Kakuma are similarly applied in the Kalobeyei settlement. For instance, as in the Kakuma camp, refugees in Kalobeyei must request travel permission for any distant trips beyond Kakuma. One livelihood development officer of UNHCR implementing partner lamented the current situation of Kalobeyei as follows:

Refugees' freedom of movement is restricted like Kakuma. The Kenyan government is reluctant to give refugees travel permission for national security reasons... Kalobeyei is increasingly regulated like the Kakuma camp. They are not that different now.

As Fig. 58 illustrates, travel outside Kakuma and Kalobeyei was very limited; 4.8% of respondents in Kakuma said they had travelled elsewhere in Kenya in the preceding year, compared with 3.2% in Kalobeyei.

As in Kakuma, refugees living in Kalobeyei are given access to use land but do not actually own any fixed property. They may take moveable property with them if they are resettled, repatriated or relocated, but fixed assets remain part of the land that they leave behind. The WFP has provided clear guidelines to Bamba Chakula dealers as they have constructed their shops throughout the Kalobeyei settlement, but non-Bamba Chakula business people are often uncertain of their status on the soil where they have constructed their livelihoods. For many refugees, who may not expect to be moved from Kalobeyei in the near future, this is not necessarily a major problem. But if refugees have expectations of resettlement or relocation, they may be reluctant to invest in developing their shops, restaurants or other business structures, as they will not have secure legal ownership of the assets that they invest in its development. This is also a problem in Kakuma, and while refugees have managed to develop informal systems of property exchange using both refugee brokers and sometimes corrupt officials, many people have lost assets when they have relied on informal unwritten arrangements. Refugees in Kalobeyei may develop similar informal systems or be reluctant to invest in Kalobeyei if Kenyan and international agencies do not provide clear guidance relating to property rights.

The fact that many regulatory constraints affecting Kakuma refugees also apply in Kalobeyei does not mean that the initial idea of KISEDP has been abandoned. We interviewed both UNHCR and WFP officers, and according to one UNHCR officer, 'For the time being, Kalobeyei is in an emergency situation with influxes of South Sudanese refugees. However, in the long term, our approach to Kalobeyei is different from the camp approach.' A WFP officer corroborated this by saying 'Currently, emergency assistance is necessary for refugees in Kalobeyei, but we are gradually shifting it to a more developmental approach.'




Fig. 58: Travelled elsewhere in Kenya in the past 12 months

10. Policy recommendations

The Kalobeyei self-reliance experiment matters, both for Kenya and the wider world. The model is remarkable because it is a designed refugee settlement, created specifically to encourage socio-economic integration. But it also represents an opportunity to learn.

Given that recently arrived South Sudanese refugees have been allocated to both Kalobeyei (more of a 'self-reliance model') and Kakuma (more of an 'aid model'), it offers a unique opportunity to compare outcomes for refugees across the two different models; effectively a 'natural experiment'. The comparison between outcomes for newly arrived South Sudanese refugees allocated across the two models is especially instructive. Three major insights

First, self-reliance may lead to better outcomes. Even at this early stage, refugees in Kalobeyei are better off in terms of income, food security, and consumption. For example, South Sudanese refugees in Kalobeyei have a median income nearly twice as high as in Kakuma. They eat more meals per day and have higher levels of food security. This suggests that, even at an early stage, there are some positive impacts from the model.

A significant part of the difference appears to be attributable to the different international interventions. For example, the monthly Bamba Chakula cash credit of 14 USD in Kalobeyei compared to 3-5 USD in Kakuma raises income and consumption. The 'kitchen gardens' are small but they have a statistically significant correlation with higher food consumption and food security outcomes.

Second, designed settlements may have inherent limitations. Kakuma's 'aid' model appears to lead to better outcomes for asset accumulation, participation in sports, and community activities. One possible explanation is that these are areas that take time to develop at a communal level. Diverse markets and social engagement take time to develop and designed settlements may suffer from analogous challenges to designed cities, like Brasilia, Canberra, and Chandigarh in requiring time for organic social structures to emerge. This is not necessarily inevitable but invites consideration of how to build community participation over time. This underscores the lesson that refugees themselves must participate in change; development is co-produced and cannot simply be designed from the outside.

Third, regional development is crucial. In reality, nearly all newly arrived refugees in both Kakuma and Kalobeyei are struggling economically. It cannot be said that recently arrived refugees in either model have achieved a measurable degree of self-reliance. Few recently arrived refugees have an income-generating activity and those that do mainly work

as 'incentive workers' for NGOs, labour markets are almost non-existent, and formal credit and savings institutions are limited. One of the main reasons behind this is that Turkana County is remote and poor. To create real economic change will require major investment in the entire economy of Turkana County. Here, business and donors have a macroeconomic role to play.

Beyond, Kenya, the Kalobeyei experiment has wider implications for the global refugee system. It shows that progressive policy change is possible. Local champions, like the Governor of Turkana, have been important in enabling this model to emerge. But enabling self-reliance is not just about commitments; it is about the technical capacity to identify effective development interventions. It is here that data and research have a central role to enable learning, improvement, and accountability. It is too early to say whether the Kalobeyei experiment has been effective, or to definitely say which aspects of the model should be scaled. But there are elements that are promising and can be built upon. A number of specific policy recommendations stand out on how to improve self-reliance outcomes for refugees in Kalobeyei.

Promote kitchen gardens

Kitchen gardens are popular among refugees, especially the South Sudanese. Our study has found that kitchen gardens are positively correlated with better nutrition, higher dietary diversity and reduced food insecurity. Considering that the vast majority of refugees in Kalobeyei are interested in agriculture, agencies could increase support for kitchen gardens by providing seeds and tools.

Conduct assessments on the feasibility of larger-scale cultivation in agricultural areas

Compared with settlements in Uganda, agricultural allotments per household in Kalobeyei are smaller and have less access to water. A total of 95% of refugees identify lack of water as the main obstacle to cultivation. While there are large aquifers beneath Turkana, more research should be undertaken to assess their recharge rates, to ensure that exploiting them for agriculture is sustainable and does not impact known water sources. Desalination may also be necessary for certain crop varieties. If water remains inadequate for conventional crops, dryland varieties such

as cowpea and sorghum could be explored. Beyond crop production, refugees could also become involved in providing environmental services by supplementing the seed cover and cultivating fodder for sale to the host community. Such programmes have been implemented amongst agriculturalists living amongst pastoralists in other parts of Kenya. 20 Refugees may also be incorporated in tree planting and forestry protection programmes, as was proposed by the host community over a decade ago.21

Implement economic and risk assessment for the livestock market in Kalobeyei

As of the period of research, there were livestock markets only in Kakuma camps 1 and 3, with an informal sale yard in the Hong Kong area of Kakuma camp 2. Livestock transactions take place in Kalobeyei, where the price for a goat is 500 to 1,000 KES less than in Kakuma. Constructing a livestock market would allow the County government to collect a small tax on livestock sales. Furthermore, the government could implement basic oversight to prevent the sale of stolen or raided animals. Kakuma was once notorious as a destination for thieves and cattle rustlers, and some argued that the camp actually increased the risk of losing livestock assets to those hoping to cash in on stolen animals. However, the deployment of officials familiar with the brand markings of animals in Turkana and surrounding areas was found to reduce the problem. An assessment should be conducted to determine the economic feasibility, expected tax revenue and security implications of a formal livestock market in Kalobeyei.

Facilitate transport between Kakuma and Kalobeyei

While refugees in Kenya do not have freedom of movement beyond the area, there is frequent and constant movement between Kakuma and Kalobeyei for both economic and personal reasons (e.g. kinship links, community events). Aid organisations should facilitate this connectivity to support supply chains and avoid the perception of Kalobeyei as 'remote'. A coordinated public transport scheme could ease the movement of refugees between the two sites. Existing private transport operators (motorbikes and vehicles) should be incorporated and coordinated rather than replaced, to avoid upsetting existing livelihoods. UNHabitat is already exploring possibilities for a transport system across the three village areas within Kalobeyei.

Conduct further research on the observed and potential impact of credit and savings on self-reliance

Being employed is positively correlated with better nutritional outcomes, and many refugees would like to work. However, because of restrictions on employment and limited assets, very few refugees have access to employment or are engaged in an economic activity. Refugees cite lack of access to

credit as the biggest barrier to starting a business, although some Somali and Ethiopian refugees have managed to use customary finance mechanisms to launch businesses. Further research should provide more detailed information about existing formal and informal credit and savings institutions in Kakuma and Kalobeyei, the ways that refugees have used or intend to use credit, and the regulatory framework governing access to commercial credit. If commercial credit is inaccessible due to high interest rates, requirements for collateral or legal restrictions, then alternative low-interest options may be explored.

Invest in human capital

Our findings show that education, vocational training and Swahili language skills correlate positively with employment, which in turn correlates with improved nutritional indicators. Educational and vocational opportunities for children and adults should be expanded, as the education level of refugees appears to be limited, especially in Kalobeyei. Additionally, knowledge of Swahili among refugees is variable but generally poor. While most Burundian refugees can speak Swahili, most South Sudanese and Ethiopians cannot. Swahili language courses could be expanded in both the camps and among the rural Turkana host population, many of whom speak very limited Swahili. This would not only facilitate employment, but also encourage communication and interactions across the refugee and host communities.

Increase agency engagement with the Turkana host populations

Residents and representatives of the host community in Kalobeyei have complained of infrequent and irregular contact with agencies. Aid organisations should more regularly meet with the host populations in a variety of formats, both through meetings with host community representatives and through larger public town halls. Additionally, the WFP and other agencies should have a coherent and coordinated outreach so that host populations do not receive conflicting messages, and unrealistic expectations should be addressed directly. Otherwise, growing frustration amongst hosts could threaten relationships with refugee populations. The outreach leading up to the Terms of Engagement has fostered enthusiasm among some sectors of the host community, but expectations and demands vary. For example, a respondent in Lokwamor, a settlement several hours' walk from the Kalobeyei settlement, stated:

We told them to give us whatever good things they would give the refugees, because we gave our land to the refugees hoping to benefit from them. We told them that if they build a school or hospital or dig water for the refugees, they should also do the same for us. But since then, nothing has been done for us. We cannot even tell how we relate with the refugees.

²⁰ AECF (2017). Women adopt grass farming for sustainable incomes in rural Kenya, https://www.aecfafrica.org/index.php/news/story/women_adopt_grass_farming_for_ sustainable_incomes_in_rural_kenya

²¹ Aukot, E. (2003). It is better to be a refugee than a Turkana in Kakuma: revisiting the relationship between hosts and refugees in Kenya. Refuge, 21(3), p78.

As this comment suggests, many in the host community expect parallel rather than integrated services and infrastructure. For job opportunities, parallel provision may be the only feasible strategy, but for infrastructure, official plans and local expectations seem to diverge.

Support access to energy

In both sites, there is no centralised provision of electricity for refugees. But in Kakuma, an informal network of generator operators provides electricity at particular times to nearby consumers. A similar arrangement has arisen in some parts of Kalobeyei. While more sustainable forms of energy such as solar farms should be the ultimate goal for areas excluded from larger electrical grids, the generator operators could be facilitated as a temporary entrepreneurial measure. Operators could be provided with loans and installation support from agencies, which could also ensure that wiring is not installed so as to create a fire hazard.

Protect informal water resources

While water is provided through a centralised strategy by the Norwegian Refugee Council, Lutheran World Federation and other partners, it is nonetheless supplemented in both sites by hand-dug riverine wells (*ngʻakar* in Turkana language). Such wells are usually used by one family, but those built close to settlements like Kalobeyei may be used by the broader public. Well contamination can be a point of conflict between refugees and herders, some of whom prefer the shallow wells to the borehole pumps when watering animals. Informal water provision has created economic opportunities for the host community in Kakuma, who can sell water or carry it for a fee. However, this informal market reflects the inadequacy of formal water provision.

Develop a gendered approach to promote self-reliance among women in Kalobeyei

As specified in the EU's Support Programme for Kalobeyei, women and children should be recognised as a potentially vulnerable group, and gender indicators should be desegregated where possible. While gender ratios among Burundian, Somali and Ethiopian refugees are 50:50 across the two camps, 77% of South Sudanese refugees in Kalobeyei are women, many of whom are not used to being their families' sole breadwinners. The baseline report finds that women in Kalobeyei and Kakuma are more likely than men to be in a caretaker role and to rely on food aid, and that they are less likely to be employed, to participate in leisure or community activities, to be educated, or to have access to credit or savings. Reasons cited for unemployment are childcare obligations or domestic work as opposed to an inability to find work, which was the most common answer among men. More positively, women in the two camps are more likely to have a varied diet. Given the variation of experiences based on gender, more research should be conducted and efforts made to take a gendered approach to self-reliance. Efforts should be made to understand why women and girls are not participating in community groups and to rectify this disparity. Furthermore, given that women

eat a more varied diet, more research should be conducted into whether women should be given preference for receipt and use of the Bamba Chakula transfer. Lastly, more efforts to help women overcome the barriers to employment should be identified and expanded, including the development of community self-help organisations for women, which could incorporate activities such as running day-care centres and operating cooperative/communal financing groups.

Learn from Bamba Chakula

While initial findings suggest that food security, dietary diversity and food consumption are better in Kalobeyei than Kakuma, it is too early to conclude that Bamba Chakula is the cause of this difference. However, based on findings on food consumption, we can recommend that meat and fish traders be registered for Bamba Chakula, with the necessary health standards. We understand that this is currently being implemented for fish traders. These initial findings also suggest several interesting ways to tailor future research. For example, qualitative evidence suggests that there is a trade-off to restricting Bamba Chakula registration to a limited number of traders. On the one hand, those traders are more likely to turn a sufficient profit to improve self-reliance indicators. On the other hand, non-registered entrepreneurs in Kalobeyei will be excluded from the Bamba Chakula market, preventing the more organic emergence of 'home-grown' businesses. This is especially exacerbated in a context where people are highly Bamba Chakula-reliant and have less access to cash from the trade of in-kind food rations. Future surveys could be extended to include the households of the registered Bamba Chakula traders in Kalobeyei, as well as some non-registered informal traders. Interesting points of comparison would be the relative self-reliance of Bamba Chakula and informal traders in Kalobeyei, as well as informal traders across Kalobeyei and Kakuma.



Acknowledgments

We are grateful to the World Food Programme for funding the research on which this report is based. In particular, we wish to thank Annalisa Conte, Paul Turnbull, Shaun Hughes, and Zippy Mbati; as well as their colleagues, Margaret Aluda, Winston Kivuitu, Bedan Mbugi, Baker Mukeere, Beatrice Mwongela, Silvano Ndwiga, Sam Okara, Frank Songa, Julie Tembwa, Boniface Wanganju, and Hellen Wanjiru. We also acknowledge the support of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, which funded the design and printing of this report.

In addition, we were supported by a number of other organisations; notably UNHCR, UN-Habitat, FAO, the EU, Lutheran World Federation, the National Council of Churches of Kenya, the Norwegian Refugee Council, SIDA, USAID, DFID, and Don Bosco. Within these organisations, several individuals were exceptionally supportive: Tayyar Sukru Cansizoglu and Kattan Donya at UNHCR, Anita Oberai at USAID, Michael Ngutu at FAO, Joy Keiru-Simiyu at DFID, and Natalie Mitchell-Bennett of the EU Delegation.

We gratefully acknowledge the support of the Government of Kenya for hosting our research, particularly the Refugee Affairs Secretariat. We were supported by the Turkana County Government, including the Assistant County Commissioner, and local Turkana chiefs who granted permission to do research among the host populations.

We wish to thank Patrick Mutinda and Helen Karanja, who worked as our research coordinators in Kenya, Killion Eyenae who worked as an ethnographic research assistant within the host community, and all of our enumerators from within the South Sudanese, Somali, Burundian, and Turkana communities. Laura Brouwer and Samuel Ritholtz made significant contributions as our research assistants in the field and in Oxford. Finally, the report would also not have been possible without the coordination, support, and editing of Isabelle Machado Aires.







Refugee Studies Centre

Oxford Department of International Development University of Oxford, 3 Mansfield Road Oxford, OX1 3TB, United Kingdom

Tel: +44 (0)1865 281720 Email: rsc@qeh.ox.ac.uk Web: www.rsc.ox.ac.uk